EVALUATION REPORT

LEARNING-FOCUSED EVALUATION OF THE UNICEF MOZAMBIQUE RESPONSE TO THE LEVEL 2 EMERGENCY IN CABO DELGADO

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Final Report

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

4Ws	who is doing what, where and when
AAP	accountability to affected populations
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ADIN	Agency for the Integrated Development of the North
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency International
AIFO	Amici di Raoul Follereau
C4D	Communication for Development
CAAC	children and armed conflict
CBO	community-based organization
CCCs	Core Commitments for Children (in Emergencies)
CCD	Care for Child Development
CD	Cabo Delgado
CEAP	corporate emergency activation procedure
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CFLS	child-friendly learning spaces
CHC	Centre for Humanitarian Change
CHW	community health worker
CLTS	Community-Led Total Sanitation
COVID-19	coronavirus disease
CP	child protection
CPD	Country Programme Document (UNICEF)
CPE	country programme evaluation
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSO	civil society organization
DAC	Development Assistant Committee (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
DPE	Provincial Directorate of Education
DPT3	three doses of combined diphtheria/pertussis /tetanus vaccine
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EiE	Education in Emergency
EPF	Emergency Programme Fund (UNICEF)
EPR	emergency preparedness and response
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (UNICEF)
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FGD	focus group discussion
FIPAG	Water Supply Investment and Asset-Holding Fund
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GBV	gender-based violence
GBViE	gender-based violence in emergencies
HAC	Humanitarian Action for Children
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
ICCG	Inter-Cluster Coordination Group

ICCM	integrated community case management
ICS	Instituto de Comunicação Social-Sede
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ID	identity document
IDP	internally displaced person
IHEK	interagency health emergency kit
IM	information management
INAS	National Institute of Social Action
INGO	international non-governmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	implementing partner
IPC	interpersonal communication
IR	incidence rate
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IYCF	infant and young child feeding
JAM	Joint Aid Management
JRP	Joint Response Plan / Joint Response Programme
KII	key informant interviews
LFE	learning-focused evaluation
LNG	liquefied natural gas
L2	Level Two
MCO	Mozambique Country Office
MGCAS	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action
MHPSS	mental health and psychosocial support
MINEDH	Ministry of Education and Human Development
MOPHRH	Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources
MSF	Médicins Sans Frontières
MUAC	mid-upper-arm circumference
NCRP	Northern Crisis Recovery Project
NFI	non-food items
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
OCV	oral cholera vaccine
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PCA	programme cooperation agreement
PD	programme document
PEBE	school-based emergency preparedness plan
PPE	personal protective equipment
PSEA	prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse
PSN	Programme Strategy Note
PSS	pupil support services
PWD	person(s) with disabilities
RCCE	risk communication and community engagement
RTE	real-time evaluation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAG	special advisory group
SAM	severe acute malnutrition

SCI	Save the Children International
SitRep	situation report
SOP	standard operating procedure
SP	social protection
SPAS	Provincial Social Affairs Service
SPI	Provincial Infrastructure Service
SSA	short service agreement
TLS	temporary learning space
TOC	theory of change
TOR	terms of reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAC	violence against children
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This report presents the outcome of the learning-focused evaluation (LFE) of the UNICEF Mozambique response to the Level 2 (L2) emergency in Cabo Delgado Province (16 June 2020 – 31 October 2021), commissioned by ESARO in accordance with the requirements for L2 emergencies. The LFE covers the UNICEF Mozambique Country Office response to the L2 emergency in Cabo Delgado from June 2020 to the present, in accordance with the terms of reference (TOR). The evaluation assignment began in June 2021 and extended to October 2021.

Context

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado has its roots in a long history of conflict going back to the civil war as well as economic marginalisation and tribal power dynamics[1]. The perception of exclusion from the benefits of natural resources exploitation in the province amidst growing poverty and lack of opportunity (the province has the highest illiteracy rate in the country, at 67 per cent, and a high youth unemployment rate, estimated at 88 per cent) created a youth-led movement which started a relatively small rebellion in 2017. Several attacks on civilians in 2018 and 2019 were met with a military response from the Government. As a result, increasing numbers of residents left their homes in the northern districts of Palma, Moçimboa da Praia and Nangade and moved to the relative safety of Pemba. The situation escalated to a humanitarian crisis in 2020 with continuing violent attacks and consequent displacement, with current estimates of 642,404 internally displaced persons in Cabo Delgado and an additional 99,448 internally displaced persons in Nampula. Of these, 81 per cent are living with host families and 46 per cent are children.[2]

The crisis in Cabo Delgado is essentially a child protection emergency. Children in the conflict-affected areas already faced vulnerability and deprivation because of frequent natural disasters, poor access to basic services and disease outbreaks. Cyclone Kenneth caused widespread damage and displacement in April 2019, leaving 374,000 people in need of humanitarian assistance and ongoing support for the cholera outbreak that followed.[3] In 2020, COVID-19 and its restrictions, including a national curfew, limited economic opportunities for residents in the province. Child poverty is also considerably higher in the northern and central provinces than those in the south: the Cabo Delgado child poverty rate is estimated at 50 per cent.[4]

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[1] International Crisis Group, 'Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado, Report no. 303/Africa, 11 June 2021, ICG, <www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques-cabo-delgado>. 'accessed on [24 June 2021].

[2] International Organization for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Mozambique, Southern Africa, April 2021, DTM, https://dtm.iom.int/reports/iom-dtm-baseline-assessment-report-round-13-september-2021.

[3] Edgar M. Cambaza, et al., 'Outbreak of Cholera Due to Cyclone Kenneth in Northern Mozambique, 2019'. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, August 2019, 16(16): 2925, <www.researchgate.net/publication/335191534_Outbreak_of_Cholera_Due_to_Cyclone_Kenneth_in_Northern_Mozambique_2019>.

[4] Lucia Ferrone et al., 'Child Poverty in Mozambique – Multiple Overlapping Deprivation Analysis, May 2019, UNICEF <www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/WP2019-03.pdf>.

UNICEF's strategy has evolved with the crisis from basic relief distribution to internally displaced persons in late 2019 to the latest revision of the Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal, which targets up to half a million people with multiple interventions in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health, nutrition, social protection, education, child protection and communication for development (C4D). As the conflict seems likely to become a protracted crisis for the population of Cabo Delgado, the next stage for UNICEF is to develop a longer-term strategy for the complex needs in a protracted conflict crisis in disaster-prone regions. UNICEF has an opportunity to build capacity with its government partners and local organizations, and to strengthen systems for preparedness and resilience to multiple shocks.

Objectives, purpose, scope, and methodology of the evaluation

The overarching purpose of the LFE was to promote learning and support mid-term course corrections and long-term planning for what comes after the Cabo Delgado L2 response. In agreement with the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG), there was a slight shift of focus from mid-response course correction to reviewing and learning from the response and adopting a more integrated strategy, blending the strengths of a development programme with preparedness and response capacity. The objectives of the LFE were to:

- Provide a preliminary assessment of UNICEF's response to the Cabo Delgado crisis regarding its relevance, effectiveness, coverage, coordination, and partnerships, with a specific focus on its adaptivity to changing conditions and how it has addressed marginalization and deprivation.
- Use key lessons and recommendations from the response thus far to enable the UNICEF Mozambique Country Office (MCO) to make mid-term adjustments and to formulate the transition from an L2 emergency response to long-term strategy as part of the new Country Programme Document (CPD).

The evaluation covered the period from the start of the UN's Rapid Response Plan, in June 2020, through the L2 emergency activation, in November 2020, to the present. The timing was designed to allow the findings to feed into a conflict- and fragility-sensitive CPD for UNICEF. Although all sectors were considered, only education, WASH and child protection were explored through detailed data collection. The anticipated outputs set out in the TOR were altered to include recommendations for a strategic direction for an integrated programme for the northern provinces rather than a response theory of change. The LFE considered the following core learning questions:

- How well has UNICEF responded to the Cabo Delgado emergency?
- What UNICEF approaches have had the most impact on the needs of affected households and what are the barriers in the response so far?
- What actions and changes in strategy are required to develop a conflict-sensitive, long-term programme for Cabo Delgado?



The LFE learning questions were expanded into a full evaluation matrix (as summarized in Annex 2). The matrix guided the design of questionnaire guides (supplied in Annex 4) and helped to identify key informants and focus group respondents. The steps in the evaluation are shown in the figure (*left*).

In line with the TOR, field data was collected fully independently of UNICEF, with the LFE team organizing its own transport and security and setting up focus groups and key informant interviews directly with partners, stakeholders, and local authorities. The members of the ERG provided guidance on and input for the methodology, and co-created conclusions and recommendations. A Special Advisory Group (SAG) was formed to allow external stakeholders to participate at key points in the evaluation.

The very short period available for data collection in Cabo Delgado prevented full coverage of activity sectors, geographic locations, and beneficiaries. Ideally, the team should have spent two weeks in the field. Ethical guidelines for interviewing adolescents made it difficult to organize interviews in a short field visit and the team had to adapt youth focus groups to identify the key needs and gaps in the response for adolescents. Difficulties in obtaining visa approval meant the team leader was not able to join the team for data collection in Cabo Delgado but daily consultation and joint analysis ensured the quality of the process. Ultimately the KIIs exceeded the target sample and a wide range of UNICEF and partner staff contributed.

Findings and conclusions

The findings of this LFE are based on a systematic analysis of the primary and secondary data collected. The findings and analysis presented follow the nine main criteria areas identified for this evaluation relating to the first two learning questions concerning i) UNICEF performance so far and ii) successful approaches and challenges, and address the questions prioritized in the evaluation matrix (Annex 2). The analysis of the third, forward-looking learning question is presented in the lessons learned and recommendations.

Effectiveness

On the whole, beneficiaries appreciate the support they have received from UNICEF and its partners, and the provision of hygiene kits and nutrition screening for the newly displaced was timely and effective. Both internal and external stakeholders feel that UNICEF was slow in scaling up the response and there are still significant gaps in meeting the needs of the families and children affected. While Cluster- and UNICEF-specific information management systems are improving across UNICEF, the current monitoring does not provide enough information on activities and outcomes in each location to be able to ensure an effective ‘package’ of support to affected households.

Some beneficiaries indicated that local politics and power dynamics influence the distribution of relief and that certain vulnerable groups, such as widows and persons with disabilities, do not receive support appropriate to their needs. Accountability mechanisms are not evident in the response and affected populations did not always feel consulted and have not found feedback mechanisms that they can trust.

Despite the efforts of UNICEF and Government partners, basic services are still inadequate in many of the temporary camps and host communities. Many internally displaced children, especially in older age groups, are not accessing education for a variety of reasons, including stigmatization. The limited provision of child-friendly learning spaces (CFLS) or activities for children has left many children without psychosocial support and effective rehabilitation.

Coverage and proportionality

Security constraints prevent UNICEF reaching several of the districts in the province. Some respondents felt that UNICEF had taken a very risk-averse approach compared to other humanitarian organizations

and could have taken a bolder approach to reaching displaced populations in highly conflict-affected areas.

Despite considerable scale-up in 2021, UNICEF is targeting a relatively small proportion of those in need in Cabo Delgado and is providing services to even fewer. Discussions with stakeholders suggest that UNICEF may not have the capacity to cover many districts and could therefore be more effective if it focuses on successfully supporting affected populations in a limited number of districts.

Quality and coherence

While there are gaps in meeting the needs in some areas, the response activities in most sectors have followed Sphere standards and the Core Commitments for Children. In the WASH sector, government insists on national development standards which are hard to reach in an emergency. All actors should be familiarized with Sphere standards and accountability frameworks and are following humanitarian principles.

The MCO fully recognized its humanitarian responsibility to respond to the Cabo Delgado crisis and led the United Nations Country Team in taking action. However, the MCO's inexperience in programming for a conflict crisis resulted in sometimes incoherent planning and leadership. With clearer, more strategic aims for the response, UNICEF could have mobilized appropriate resources more effectively.

Equity

The MCO commitment to inclusion, especially of persons with disabilities, is impressive and there is strong leadership and strategy in this area. Direct programming for persons with disabilities through specialist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is working well but coverage is limited. More focus on inclusion across all partner programmes is necessary but partners need capacity building to strengthen their monitoring of disability markers.

The response included some gender-specific activities, such as distribution of dignity kits and identifying girls at risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. Although gender equity is not an explicit aim of the response, sector activities could have more actively promoted gender equity and women's empowerment.

Connectedness and sustainability

UNICEF's mode of delivery through Government is a good strategy for ensuring connectedness with long-term programming. It helps capacity building, harmonization and sustainability itself. However, the overall sustainability of the resettlement of internally displaced persons is questionable without significant investment in livelihood opportunities. Displaced families are reluctant to participate in delivering sustainable services and behaviour change communication when they feel their settlement is temporary. There are positive attempts to ensure sustainability of services (e.g., in WASH) but access to nutrition and health services for internally displaced persons is not likely to be sustained without moving away from a sole reliance on mobile health brigades.

The combined HAC and response plan that aims to address the needs of populations affected by three very different disasters is not fit for purpose for a complex, protracted crisis. A separate response plan for the conflict crisis would be difficult to manage but would allow for adapted benchmarks and indicators which are more appropriate to the context.

The MCO's willingness to learn from the response to the cyclones and the conflict in Cabo Delgado and apply the lessons learned to the new CPD is encouraging. The new CPD incorporates more risk-related thinking and some Programme Strategy Notes (PSNs), notably education and child protection, have integrated risk-informed and shock-responsive approaches. However, all the sector result frameworks are orientated towards a traditional development programme, despite Mozambique's risk profile, and still leave 'emergency projects' in a silo.

Collaboration and partnerships will be required to connect the emergency response to more sustainable service provision. The education CPD is already promoting stronger collaboration among sections, Clusters, and the World Bank by jointly formulating an analysis and strategic response document with a budget on behalf of the Ministry of Education and Human Development (MINEDH).

Coordination and partnerships

Partnership with Government is strong, valuable, and appreciated, but development-orientated rather than emergency-focused systems slow down response. Other government partnerships (such as in WASH, Health and C4D) demonstrate that the government has mechanisms in place to quickly respond to emergencies.

UNICEF has gradually increased capacity to meet its responsibilities for cluster coordination. However, having UNICEF emergency managers take on the additional role of cluster coordinators compromises the independence and neutrality of the Clusters, leaves gaps in coordination, and may discourage some actors from participating.

There is evidence of weaknesses in internal UNICEF coordination both vertically (between the Maputo and Pemba offices) and laterally (across sectors) despite considerable efforts to maintain good communication during the COVID-19 restrictions. The establishment of a strong team in Pemba to manage and coordinate the response was a positive step but better coordination mechanisms and tools are needed.

The lack of major international NGOs has resulted in a perception that the humanitarian capacity of partners is a constraint to the response. However, there are unexplored opportunities to build local partnerships with local NGOs and civil society organizations to strengthen the response capacity.

Successful approaches for replication

The WASH and health sectors collaborated well in the cholera response and explored options for multi-sector activities delivered by one partner.

Community-based implementation approaches, including strengthening networks of community health workers and working with community-based organizations (CBOs), including women's organizations, for labour-intensive activities, appear to be successful in both internally displaced groups and host communities. There are opportunities to explore alternative engagement processes beyond programme document-based contracting and to involve community workers (*activistas*) more consistently in programme design and delivery.

There was rapid mobilization of teams to provide immediate support to newly displaced persons at the arrival and transit sites, as well as several Joint Response Project distributions in Mueda and Palma. Stronger coordination from OCHA is required to replicate this at scale as a standby capacity.

Increasing capacity in information management in Pemba presents an opportunity to advance the adaptation and use of digital platforms for monitoring, thus improving response efficiency, especially if used by the Clusters.

Approaches that need adaptation or that should be discontinued

Local and international staff have managed the Cabo Delgado response to the best of their ability. However, the complexity of the crisis and the need for humanitarian action that is clearly independent of all parties to the conflict, together with the challenges of working with a limited number of partners, with narrow expertise, required a permanent team of dedicated, well-trained staff based in Pemba. Despite learning from the Cyclone Idai response and a commitment to building more institutional humanitarian capacity, the Pemba office relied too heavily on short-term surge inputs, it took too long to establish the office and it is still not at full capacity.

Monitoring systems that rely only on HAC indicators are not the most useful tool for the response managers. Examples of area-specific monitoring systems exist in the Clusters. An activity tracker introduced for the Cyclone Idai response could be adapted by the UNICEF Pemba team to identify gaps and opportunities for integrated service delivery. This should be a light tool and designed to aid field decision making.

Lessons learned

Some barriers and challenges were highlighted in previous responses (cyclone Idai) but the recommended solutions have not been initiated in time to be applied in Cabo Delgado. The solutions include improved information management systems, emergency preparedness and response (EPR) training for key staff, strategic use of surge deployments and reinforced standard operating procedures for accountability to affected populations.

There has been rapid staff turnover. New staff did not review or learn from cyclones Idai and Kenneth, so the Cabo Delgado response is, in essence, starting from scratch. The Nampula response was built on more solid learning within the team and partners. The MCO has tried to respond to some of the lessons learned from Idai, including running EPR training, but the training wasn't considered very effective in building capacity.

The MCO has accepted the opportunity to learn from the response of the last 18 months through this LFE and staff have generously committed time to contributing lessons learned and ideas for developing a more agile preparedness and response strategy. The recently produced PSNs reflect more 'nexus' thinking for programming in these high-risk areas but not all sector results frameworks have fully integrated risk-informed and shock-responsive plans.

Learning from outside of Mozambique on approaches for programming in protracted crises will be valuable. It seems the earlier perception that Mozambique was not in a complex emergency has hindered this learning. Exchanging ideas and lessons with other UNICEF country offices with experience in this type of programming would be a good way to strengthen the Cabo Delgado response.

Recommendations

As requested in the TOR, the evaluation team formulated forward-looking and actionable recommendations to improve the ongoing responses as well as strengthen programme strategies for the

next Mozambique Country Programme. These recommendations were developed out of the evaluation findings as well as the learning event with the ERG.

Immediate adaptations to improve the emergency response

1. UNICEF needs to **focus the programme in Cabo Delgado to fill gaps in unmet needs, especially in child protection**. Considering the funding constraints, this could be achieved by prioritizing critical needs in areas where UNICEF and its partners have capacity and access, without expanding the geographic coverage.

2. UNICEF should commit to **dedicated resources for coordination in all Clusters where UNICEF leads or has an area of responsibility**. There should be a Pemba-based coordinator and an information management specialist in each cluster who is not also acting as a UNICEF emergency programme manager.

3. **UNICEF should continue to collaborate with IOM and WFP to activate the JRP** and jointly strengthen targeting and accountability mechanisms across the response. This requires dedicated staffing for JRP.

4. **Displaced children must be encouraged urgently to go back to school, either through access to formal education or by providing safe learning spaces closer to their settlements.** The education programme should build capacity in government on how to monitor the integration of displaced children into existing schools and temporary learning spaces.

5. **The capacity of staff and the internal processes of the MCO and its key partners should be reviewed and strengthened to better manage emergency and nexus programmes.** This should build on the earlier ERP training but focus on filling specific capacity gaps for effective programming in Cabo Delgado.

6. UNICEF should review the planning and monitoring system for the current emergencies and consider adopting **a more flexible plan specific to Cabo Delgado, with clear strategic objectives and activity and outcome monitoring** appropriate for a protracted crisis**.**

Changes in strategy for conflict-sensitive programming in Cabo Delgado Province

7. In support of the recommendations from the Country Programme Evaluation, the LFE team recommends that UNICEF **be more focused on doing a few things well instead of too many things poorly**.

8. **UNICEF should develop a comprehensive strategy for the northern Mozambique programme with a focus on resilience and preparedness.** Use experience and resilience models from other protracted crises to develop this strategy.

9. **UNICEF should explore options for new, strategic partnerships**, including partnerships with local NGOs and CBOs with a focus on building capacity for humanitarian action.

10. **UNICEF should adopt a programme approach for provincial and district towns that focuses on expanded service delivery for periphery settlements** rather than camps for internally displaced persons.

1 BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

The Centre for Humanitarian Change (hereinafter, CHC) is pleased to submit this final report to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) for the learning-focused evaluation (LFE) of the UNICEF Mozambique response to the Level 2 (L2) emergency in Cabo Delgado from 16 June 2020 to 31 October 2021.

In accordance with the coverage norms of UNICEF's Evaluation Policy 2018, short-term L2 emergencies must be evaluated at least once and protracted L2 emergencies should be evaluated once every three years. Such L2 evaluations are conducted by the Evaluation Section of the respective UNICEF Regional Office. This evaluation conforms to the provisions of the UNICEF Evaluation Policy and the norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), providing a structure for reflection, learning and recommendations for what comes after the L2 response. The evaluation will inform the development of the new UNICEF CPD.

The LFE covers the UNICEF Mozambique Country Office response to the L2 emergency in Cabo Delgado from June 2020 to the present, in accordance with the terms of reference (TOR). The evaluation assignment began in June 2021 and extended to October 2021. Due to challenges in securing a visa, the CHC evaluation team leader, Nancy Balfour, was unable to travel to Mozambique. In her absence, two evaluation team members based in Mozambique (Dr. Kenly Greer Fenio and Helder Nhamaze) undertook a field visit to the districts of Metuge, Montepuez and Pemba in Cabo Delgado Province from 25 July to 1 August 2021. All data collection for this LFE with other stakeholders in and outside Mozambique was undertaken remotely, by phone or on internet platforms.

This report is structured in five chapters or sections. Following this introduction, Chapter 1 describes the country context and provides a profile of the project under evaluation. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the purpose, objectives, focus and scope of the evaluation, as well as the evaluation approach and methodology. The evaluation findings are presented in Chapter 3 and conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations are provided in Chapter 4.

Annexes are presented in a separate volume and include: the terms of reference (Annex 1); the evaluation matrix (Annex 2); the list of respondents interviewed (Annex 3); the data collection instruments (Annex 4); information about the evaluators (Annex 5); the 2020 UNICEF MCO Cabo Delgado response plan (Annex 6); the 2021UNICEF MCO Cabo Delgado response plan (Annex 7) and the Resilience and Stability Strategy for UNICEF Mozambique Northern Provinces Programme (Annex 8).

1.2 Cabo Delgado Province context

Mozambique is ranked ninth for hazard risk and sixth for vulnerability in the global INFORM disaster risk index[5]. Within this very high-risk classification, Cabo Delgado and other northern, coastal provinces have the highest vulnerability. Cabo Delgado Province covers an area of 82,625 km² in the north of Mozambique. It has a population of 2,267,715.[6] The Makonde are the biggest ethnic group and the

[5] https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Risk/Country-Profile

[6] City Population, 'Cabo Delgado', City Population, <www.citypopulation.de/en/mozambique/admin/02__cabo_delgado>.

Makua and Mwani are the main ethnic minorities. The province borders Tanzania to the north, and Nampula and Niassa provinces in Mozambique. The port city of Pemba is the provincial capital.[7] The province has 17 districts, namely Ancuabe, Balama, Chiúre, Ibo, Macomia, Mecúfi, Meluco, Metuge, Moçimboa da Praia, Montepuez, Mueda, Muidumbe, Namuno, Nangade, Palma, Pemba and Quissanga *(see Figure 1.1)*. Emakhuwa is the most widely spoken language, with 67 per cent of speakers. About 22 per cent of Cabo Delgado's population also speaks Portuguese.

Figure 1.1: Map of Cabo Delgado



Source: All Africa, August 2020, Map of Cabo Delgado

1.2.1 Socio-economic situation

Mozambique's independence war and the period just after it shaped the political economy of Cabo Delgado Province. When Portuguese rule ended in 1975, senior liberation-era figures from the ruling

[7] Wikipedia, 'Cabo Delgado Province', Wikipedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabo_Delgado_Province>.

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), mainly from the Makonde ethnic group, took top political positions and placed allies in national administrative and military posts. Illicit trade proliferated in the province from 1977 to 1992, mainly from the smuggling of timber, precious stones, and ivory. The elites expanded their business interests, which include stakes in forestry and mining, in the province. Around the same time, Cabo Delgado's remote coastline also became a documented hotspot for the import and transhipment of heroin and other narcotics via cartels.[8] Because the economic situation favoured the elite and one ethnic group, the minority Mwani ethnic group – a Muslim-majority ethnic group – has long viewed itself as politically and economically marginalized.

Even though Cabo Delgado has economic potential from tourism and natural resources, it is one of the poorest provinces in Mozambique. The dominance of the Makonde ethnic group and of illicit trade by different entities has generally benefitted elites and exacerbated poverty. Cabo Delgado has the highest illiteracy rate in the country (67 per cent), a history of economic marginalization and high youth unemployment rates (88%) .[9] Child poverty is considerably higher in the northern and central provinces than in the southern provinces; child poverty in Cabo Delgado Province is estimated at 50%[10] and children in the north are far less likely to attend school than those in the rest of the country. Primary school absenteeism and dropouts are linked to family and ceremonial commitments, inadequate infrastructure and resources, and the poor quality of teaching. Mozambique has one of the highest rates of child marriage in the world, with almost half of girls marrying before 18, and more than one in 10 married before their 15th birthday.[11] Approximately 56 per cent of reported child marriage is in rural areas, compared to 36 per cent in urban areas. 2015 data indicated that once a girl is married, she quickly becomes pregnant and drops out of school, which subsequently affects her potential for formal employment.[12]

1.2.2 Political and humanitarian situation

The combined effects of the northern conflict, climate-related disasters and COVID-19 mitigation measures have restricted economic activity, and an estimated three million people are projected to face high levels of food insecurity across the country.[13] Even though Cabo Delgado is rich in resources, most people are very poor and this has contributed to the ongoing conflict. Since 2017, groups of non-state actors have fought against the Mozambican military and communities and have been named as, or affiliated with, various entities. They are defined here simply as 'insurgents'. They have denounced the state and the ruling party and waged targeted attacks, mainly in remote parts of the province.

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[8] International Crisis Group, Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado, Report no. 303/Africa, 11 June 2021, ICG, <www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques-cabo-delgado>.

[9] 'Building Community Resilience Cabo Delgado'.

[10] A child in Cabo Delgado is nearly three times more likely to be living in poverty than a child in Maputo City. There are also disparities in age, with children under the age of 13 more likely to live in poverty than older children. Development Pathways: 'Situation of Children in Mozambique', June 2021.

[11] Plan International, 'Mozambique Bans Child Marriage', News and press release, Reliefweb, 21 August 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-bans-child-marriage>.

[12] Government of Mozambique, National Institute of Statistics, Mozambique National Survey: Population and Housing Census, 2017.

[13] The World Bank, 'The World Bank in Mozambique, Overview', the World Bank, 19 March 2021, <www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview>.

In the midst of the ongoing violence, Cyclone Kenneth made landfall in Cabo Delgado on 25 April 2019, with Macomia, Quissanga and Ibo the hardest hit districts. Approximately 40,000 houses and numerous schools and hospitals were destroyed or badly damaged. An estimated 374,000 people needed humanitarian assistance and ongoing support for the subsequent cholera outbreak.[14] As families struggled to recover from the cyclone, the insurgency continued; in January 2020, insurgents increased the scale of raids to include some of the province's main towns, resulting in increased civilian casualties. Hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans have fled their homes.

On 12 August 2020, militants linked to Islamic State seized the heavily defended port of Moçimboa da Praia after days of fighting resulted in government forces fleeing. The town is near the site of natural gas projects worth US$60 billion. Insecurity has also prompted the French multinational Total to suspend a multi-billion-dollar liquefied natural gas (LNG) project that the Government had hoped would greatly benefit the country's future development.[15] On 24 March 2021, about 200 insurgents attacked the northern town of Palma, home to hundreds of foreign workers, most of whom were contractors for the Total LNG project on the nearby Afungi peninsula. Dozens of residents were killed and much of the town's infrastructure, including banks, a police station and food aid warehouses, were destroyed. The attack was a game-changer for Mozambique, in part because it revealed the challenges of Mozambique's security forces, which struggled to defend a town of 70,000 against a couple of hundred insurgents.[16] Since the attack, Mozambique has partnered with foreign Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Rwandan troops who have entered to assist in the war.[17]

From October 2017 to the end of July 2020, there were over 656 violent events and 2,500 reported fatalities from attacks on civilians in Cabo Delgado.[18] According to the National Institute for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction (INGD), there are 862,990 people displaced in the country due to conflict in Cabo Delgado (854,264 people) and the central region (8,726 people). Of these, 48 per cent are children, 11 per cent are in resettlement sites, 6 per cent are in temporary accommodation and 83 per cent are living with host families.[19] While the number of displaced people has grown, protection risks are exacerbated by pre-existing vulnerabilities, including poverty, marginalization and harmful social and gender norms, such as child marriage, as well as a history of extreme violence during previous conflicts. COVID-19 has compounded the problem: critical services such as sexual and reproductive health care, and immunization activities, and continuity of care for HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, and cholera have been

[14] Cambaza, Cholera Outbreak Cyclone Kenneth.

[15] 'Stemming Insurrection Cabo Delgado'.

[16] Lister, Tim, 'The March 2021 Palma Attack and the Evolving Jihadi Terror Threat to Mozambique', April/May 2021, Volume 14, Issue 4, Combatting Terrorism Centre, <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-march-2021-palma-attack-and-the-evolving-jihadi-terror-threat-to-mozambique>.

[17] 'In late July 2021, a thousand-strong brigade of soldiers dispatched by Rwanda's president entered combat in Cabo Delgado. A multinational force from the SADC also deployed. On August 2021, Mozambican and Rwandan government forces took control of Moçimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado province. The town had been controlled by insurgents since August 2020.'
Financial Times. 'Rwanda joins Mozambican war to fight insurgents', Financial Times, 2 August 2021, <www.ft.com/content/8ce99bd1-c358-44cc-a77a-356985aedef2>.

[18] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Cabo Delgado data, ACLED, <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>.

[19] UNICEF, 'Mozambique Humanitarian Situation Report No. 7, 1-31 August 2021, <'https://www.unicef.org/media/107466/file/%20Mozambique-Humanitarian-SitRep-No7-31-August-2021.pdf.>.

disrupted owing to restrictions on movement and gatherings, as well as disruptions to livelihoods.[20] The increasing number of internally displaced persons in Cabo Delgado who have lost access to their typical livelihood activities and require emergency food assistance is burdening host families and communities, and straining the current capacity of the humanitarian response. This pressure has been exacerbated by the pre-existing capacity limitations on critical infrastructure and essential services. In Cabo Delgado, 45 per cent of health facilities lack access to water.[21]

The 2021 Mozambique Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) estimates around 950,000 people need food security in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula, with 750,000 people targeted for humanitarian food assistance. In May 2021, humanitarian partners provided food assistance to 651,867 people in Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces – approximately 87 per cent of the initial HRP target.[22] As of July 2021, Mozambique's HRP remained underfunded, with US$38.5 million (15.2 per cent) of the required US$254.1 million received. Despite increased donor funding after the Palma attack (US$26 million between April and July), civilian needs continue to outpace the scale-up of funding. Bureaucratic constraints and physical insecurity present significant access challenges, stifling the provision of aid in Moçimboa da Praia, Quissanga, Palma, Meluco, and Muidumbe, with partial access in Macomia, Ibo, Mueda, and Nangade.[23]

The crisis in Cabo Delgado is essentially a child protection emergency. Child vulnerability is deepening in Cabo Delgado because of the conflict and exposure to frequent hazards. Children need psycho-social support, nutrition interventions to respond to malnutrition and access to health services, particularly those who require medication for HIV and tuberculosis. Responsive service delivery has been weakened by the lack of rapid funding and resource distribution, and there is a great need to extend the reach of current services. The situation is further complicated by COVID-19. Child protection services are stretched as children who have witnessed and experienced extreme violence in conflict-affected areas, including sexual violence and kidnapping, seek support.[24] Mozambique has been improving its education system, with the abolishment of school fees, the introduction of free textbooks and investment in classroom construction but there are too many children for the number of teachers available and the teachers do not usually have sufficient training. For a full year, children were out of school owing to COVID-19 closures or a lack of safe learning spaces. In Cabo Delgado, the huge influx of internally displaced children cannot be accommodated in the existing school facilities of southern Cabo Delgado, many of which lack proper WASH facilities to meet school re-opening criteria.[25]

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[20] Julitta Onabanjo, 'Turning the tide for women and girls caught in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado crisis', Africa Renewal, March 2021, United Nations, <www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/march-2021/turning-tide-women-and-girls-caught-mozambique's-cabo-delgado-crisis>.

[21] Columbo, Emilia, and Kelly Moss, 'Centering Civilian Protection in Northern Mozambique, 21 July 2021, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, <www.csis.org/analysis/centering-civilian-protection-northern-mozambique>.

[22] Famine Early Warning Systems Network. 'Cabo Delgado expected to remain in crisis (IPC Phase 3) through January 2022', FEWS NET, June 2021 to January 22, <https://fews.net/southern-africa/mozambique/food-security-outlook/june-2021>.

[23] Columbo and Moss, 'Centering Civilian Protection Northern Mozambique'.

[24] Save the Children, 'At least 51 children kidnapped in Cabo Delgado over past 12 months', 9 June 2021, <www.savethechildren.net/news/least-51-children-kidnapped-cabo-delgado-over-past-12-months>.

[25] Save the Children, Plan International and World Vision, 'Joint Briefing Note on the situation facing children in Northern Mozambique', 16 June 2021, Save the Children, <https://mozambique.savethechildren.net/news/joint-briefing-note-situation-facing-children-northern-mozambique>.

The Mozambican Parliament approved its first law criminalizing unions with minors (those aged under 18) in December 2019. This was the culmination of years of efforts by the Government, civil society and rights-based organizations, concerned that almost half of girls in Mozambique have been married before 18. While the country is a signatory to numerous international laws,[26] implementing them is a challenge, in part due to government capacity and resource gaps, and strong regional disparity – the northern and central province indicators are consistently worse than the south. There is a process of decentralization underway, still in its early stages, that is expected to contribute to greater political inclusion.[27]

As of September, although some of the displaced are currently returning to their original areas, most analysts believe the conflict in Cabo Delgado will continue for some time. The complex combination of factors driving and fuelling the conflict, including perceived injustice and inequitable distribution of resources, and the involvement of external actors on both sides, mean that a rapid and long-lasting genuine resolution of the conflict is unlikely. Humanitarian actors are therefore preparing for a protracted crisis and looking for new ways to operate in an insecure environment.

1.2.3 UNICEF Level 2 activation and response

To respond to the increasing humanitarian needs in Cabo Delgado, the United Nations and humanitarian partners launched, on 4 June 2020, an eight-month Rapid Response Plan to support the efforts of the Government's National Institute of Disaster Management to assist affected people. The plan sought US$35.5 million to allow humanitarians to scale up urgent lifesaving and life-sustaining assistance and protection services to 354,000 people until December 2020. By November 2020, around US$23 million had been mobilized through the United Nations' Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and contributions from the international community. In August 2020, the Mozambique Government created the Agency for the Integrated Development of the North (ADIN) to address the root causes of the humanitarian crisis in Cabo Delgado and to coordinate humanitarian and development responses.[28] Aligned with the Rapid Response Plan, UNICEF implemented a multisectoral response to provide immediate emergency assistance to internally displaced persons, host communities and children in need, provide resources to support families' recovery from Cyclone Kenneth and address disease outbreaks detected in the province, mainly cholera, measles and malaria (see Annex 6 and Annex 7). Priority interventions include provision of critical supplies, strengthening the provision of basic services in health, nutrition, education, child protection, WASH and emergency social protection, and capacity building of provincial and district authorities. UNICEF prioritized the prevention of gender-based violence, prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and exploitation (PSEA) in the displaced population and in host communities. All actions were to be coordinated with the Government and through the cluster mechanism, with UNICEF leading the WASH, education and nutrition Clusters, and the child protection area of responsibility. [29]

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[26] Such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability.

[27] Concept Note for Internal Moment of Reflection, 26 July 2021.

[28] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 'Mozambique Situation Report' 30 October 2020, OCHA, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Mozambique%20-%2030%20Oct%202020.pdf>.

[29] UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children, 'Mozambique (Cabo Delgado Crisis)', Appeal, UNICEF, 2020, <www.unicef.org/media/85096/file/2020-HAC-Mozambique.pdf>.

To support humanitarian action in 2020, UNICEF appealed for US$11.1 million in November 2019 to provide life-saving services for children and their families affected by the ongoing conflict in northern Mozambique. A 41 per cent funding gap remained at the end of 2020. UNICEF launched the Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal in November 2020 to raise US$52.8 million to meet the 2021 humanitarian needs of affected children, women and adolescents in Mozambique, contain the spread of COVID-19 and respond to food and nutrition insecurity and flooding in 2021. On 28 November, UNICEF declared an L2 emergency for the Cabo Delgado crisis which covered Cabo Delgado and the neighbouring province of Nampula.

UNICEF's 2021 HAC appeal, revised in June 2021 owing to escalating needs, requested US$96.5 million to provide lifesaving and life-sustaining services for children and their caregivers in Mozambique *(see Figure 1.2)*. Some of the priorities highlighted in the HAC are: 465,300 children and women targeted to receive healthcare; 567,233 people targeted to access a sufficient quantity of safe water; 265,000 people targeted to have a safe channel to report sexual abuse and exploitation; and 2.5 million people to be reached with messages on access to services. Thus far in 2021, UNICEF Mozambique has received US$16.3 million for its humanitarian response from the governments of Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well as support from Education Cannot Wait and CERF. This includes allocations from UNICEF's unearmarked global humanitarian funding amounting to US$3.9 million. The 2021 appeal, however, still has a funding gap of 69 per cent. Significant needs remain for all of UNICEF's ongoing emergency programmes.[30]

Figure 1.2: Humanitarian Action for Children targets, June 2021



Source: UNICEF. June 2021. Humanitarian Action for Children

1.2.4 UNICEF response plans

To adequately respond to the Cabo Delgado emergency, The UNICEF Mozambique Country Office (MCO) developed operational response plans that are tied to the HAC. The response plans are for the

[30] UNICEF, 'Humanitarian Situation Report No. 5', UNICEF, June 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Mozambique%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20No.%205%20%E2%80%93%201%20January%20-%2030%20June%202021.pdf>.

periods May to December 2020 and January to December 2021 that indicate the expected core commitments for children in the nutrition, health, WASH, child protection, education, social protection and communication for development (C4D) sectors. Below is a summary of the expected results, as detailed in the response plans in Annex 6 and Annex 7, that apply to all sectors *(Figure 1.3)*:

- Effective leadership in cluster interagency coordination
- Women, children and adolescents receive lifesaving messages that promote behavioural and social change
- Inclusion of monitoring and evaluation activities (including assessments, field monitoring, studies, surveys and real-time evaluations)
- Mainstreaming protection, PSEA, and gender and disability inclusion programming into cluster strategies and responses.

Figure 1.3: Humanitarian Action for Children funding status, June 2021



	Original 2021 HAC (US$)	Revised 2021 HAC (US$)	Funds Available	2021 Funding Gap %
C4D, community engagement and AAP	2,157,840	2,566,080	1,580,481	38.40%
Social protection	7,786,886	17,533,325	8,648,748	50.70%
Education	9,716,881	24,544,106	2,618,132	89.30%
Child protection, GBViE and PSEA	6,285,963	12,371,655	3,121,161	74.80%
WASH	11,024,813	22,468,754	7,400,661	67.10%
Health	10,845,022	12,000,000	2,784,132	76.80%
Nutrition	4,980,528	5,000,000	574,556	88.50%

Source: UNICEF, June 2021, Humanitarian Action for Children

1.2.5 Key government partners

The MCO works in partnership with the Government of Mozambique and its ministries at national and provincial level. Table 1.1 presents the key government partners by outcome area.

Table 1.1: UNICEF'S key government partners

Sector	Key government partners (duty bearers)
Nutrition	Cabo Delgado Provincial Directorate of Health
Health	Cabo Delgado Provincial Directorate of Health
WASH	Cabo Delgado Provincial Directorate of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources
Education	Cabo Delgado Education Provincial Directorate
Child protection and social protection	Cabo Delgado Provincial Directorate of Gender, Children and Social Action, Cabo Delgado Provincial Social Affairs Service, Cabo Delgado Provincial Department of Justice, National Institute of Social Action
Communication for development	Cabo Delgado Provincial Social Affairs Service, Cabo Delgado Provincial Directorate of Health, National AIDS Council, Institute for Social Communication

1.2.6 Implementing partners (duty bearers)

During the period under evaluation, the MCO collaborated with a number of implementing partners in Cabo Delgado including national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international NGOs.

Implementing partners include: Ayuda en Accion, Caritas Internationalis, Save the Children International (SCI), Amici di Raoul Follereau (AIFO), Fundação AVSI Moçambique, Doctors with Africa CUAMM, Instituto de Comunicação Social-Sede (ICS), Kulima, We World-GVC, Joint Aid Management (JAM), Helpcode, Associação Helpo, Helvetas, Norwegian Refugee Council and the Aga Khan Foundation.

Other international organizations and United Nations agencies active in Cabo Delgado include: Médicins sans Frontières (MSF), Care International, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNDP, World Food Programme (WFP), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), IOM, Street Child.

A full list of partners is included in Annex 9.

1.2.7 Beneficiaries (rights holders and duty bearers)

Young girls and boys, adolescents and women in Cabo Delgado are direct beneficiaries of UNICEF efforts as rights holders. Indirect beneficiaries of UNICEF support (and duty bearers) include the Government of Mozambique and its ministries and departments at the national and provincial level, through which UNICEF supports capacity building and service delivery. Other indirect beneficiaries (and duty bearers) include community actors and community-based structures and organizations which UNICEF supports to promote and protect child rights. Finally, civil society organizations, development partners and private sector organizations are targeted by MCO as indirect beneficiaries of UNICEF's upstream work in policy dialogue and advocacy for child rights.

2 EVALUATION PURPOSE, APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Evaluation purpose and objectives

The overarching purpose of the LFE is to promote learning and support mid-term course corrections and long-term planning for what comes after the Cabo Delgado L2 emergency response (see Annex 1). The objectives of the LFE are to:

- Provide a preliminary assessment of UNICEF's response to the Cabo Delgado crisis regarding its appropriateness or relevance, effectiveness, coverage, connectedness, and coordination and partnerships, with a specific focus on the adaptiveness and responsiveness of the response and how it has addressed marginalization and depravation.
- Draw out key lessons and recommendations from the response to date in order to equip UNICEF Mozambique decision-makers with the information they need to make adjustments at mid-term and formulate the MCO's response transition from L2 emergency to long-term strategy as part of the new Country Programme Document (CPD).

2.1.1 Changes in the terms of reference

Minor changes to the TOR were agreed during the inception stage. The delayed start of the LFE and the preference of the MCO meant a slight shift of focus from a mid-response 'course-correction' to reviewing and learning from the evaluation and transition into a more integrated strategy, blending the strengths of development programme with preparedness and response capacity. In line with this, the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) suggested removing the component of a theory of change for the response in favour of guidance on the strategic direction for the longer-term programme in northern Mozambique.

2.1.2 Users and uses of the evaluation

The evaluation provides a structure for reflection and learning and promotes principles of participation and utilization. The primary audience for this evaluation is UNICEF management, regional advisors and MCO staff who are responsible for leading the Cabo Delgado response *(see Table 2.1)*.

The approach drew on elements of a lessons learned exercise and real-time evaluation, providing mid-term feedback and generating learning that can be used in the ongoing response and towards UNICEF's longer-term goals. The LFE was designed:

- Not to intrude on response operations, with a compressed timeline and a small evaluation team
- To be driven by questions and issues confronting MCO's response strategy that identify priority areas, gaps, and areas of focus for the post-L2 phase
- To capture system dynamics and surface innovative strategies and ideas ('what works')
- To be timed to capture emerging results at mid-term and strategically feed into the reflections for developing the new CPD

Table 2.1: Users and possible uses of the evaluation

Users		Potential uses and interests
Primary	UNICEF Mozambique Country Office	Input for development of next CPD Learning for refinement of current CPD and strategies Accountability to the Government
	Government of Mozambique	Evidence of results achieved and recommendations for CPD improvement Development of the next CPD
Secondary	Development partners	Identification of UNICEF contribution to sectors supported by donors Lessons learned to inform framework of future collaboration
	United Nations Country Team (UNCT)	Learning to improve current and future joint programming
	Implementing partners	Evidence of results achieved during the emergency, lessons learned and promising strategies
	UNICEF Headquarters and ESARO	Assessment of UNICEF's performance at country level
	Rights holders and direct beneficiaries	Girl and boy children, adolescents and women as direct beneficiaries Community actors (including duty bearers) and community-based structures

2.1.3 Evaluation criteria, scope and focus

The LFE is limited to evaluating the work of the UNICEF MCO in Cabo Delgado Province (with some exploration of the response in Nampula Province through secondary data and KIIs) and its downstream partners in responding to the crisis, considering the wider framework of the response, including that of its government counterparts at national and provincial levels, the United Nations system as a whole, the donor community, international and national NGOs, national civil society organizations and agencies involved in the response.

The LFE focused on the coverage, connectedness, effectiveness, coordination and equity of the programmatic response, the level of internal and external coordination and partnerships contributing to success or failure factors, the adaptiveness and responsiveness of the response, and how it has addressed marginalization and depravation. Using appropriateness, effectiveness, and connectedness and coherence criteria, the LFE also considered the humanitarian-development nexus with a view to mid- to long-term planning.

The evaluation considers the recent span of the emergency response to the Cabo Delgado crisis in Mozambique, starting from when the United Nations and humanitarian partners began implementing a Rapid Response Plan, in June 2020, and continuing through UNICEF’s activation of a Level 2 corporate emergency activation procedure for the Cabo Delgado crisis in Mozambique, in late November, to the

start of the evaluation, in June 2021. The evaluation took place from June 2021 to October 2021, timed to capture emerging results at midterm and strategically feed into the new CPD process.

The rationale for this scope stems from the specifications in the TOR, discussions with core UNICEF staff, and the Inception Report. These are based on the inability to access particular geographical areas due to security concerns at the time of the evaluation and limitations on timing (discussed further below).

2.1.4 Evaluation matrix and key evaluation questions

Based on the scope and focus above, an evaluation matrix was developed in the inception phase to guide data collection and analysis. This matrix was also used to develop data collection instruments. It was refined according to the recommendations of the quality assurance team to include indicators and was resubmitted on 11 August after field work had already been completed. The TOR included three learning questions and four secondary questions (sub-questions). All of the questions were discussed with the ERG during CHC's presentation of the inception phase findings on 15 July 2021. ERG members specified the insights they wished to get from the evaluation, and these were included as detailed evaluation questions in the evaluation matrix (see full Evaluation Matrix in Annex 2). In summary, the LFE considered the following core learning questions:

- How well has UNICEF responded to the Cabo Delgado emergency?
- What UNICEF approaches have had the most impact on the needs of affected households and what are the barriers in the response so far?
- What actions and changes in strategy are required to develop a conflict-sensitive, long-term programme for Cabo Delgado?

These questions guided the indicators, which in turn guided the relevant sub-questions. The latter were then utilized to develop the questionnaire design and interview/group questions were pre-coded in the questionnaires based on the relevant sub-themes (the evaluation criteria themes of effectiveness, sustainability, etc). Data collection instruments were developed for each stakeholder category, structured around the questions in the evaluation matrix (see Annex 4 for a sample of data collection tools). Because the fieldwork was qualitative, these indicators were captured as perceptions and opinions by key stakeholders and community members and are not quantified as definitive numbers as to how many respondents responded in a certain manner.

2.2 Evaluation approach

The evaluation approach was informed by multiple discussions with UNICEF staff that included scope and methodology. The team purposely considered all topical sectors but focused specifically on WASH, education and social protection. The ERG did not identify any specific sector priorities for the evaluation, but WASH has been the largest response; education had some examples of a response focuses on cyclone, COVID-19, and conflict; and protection has had challenges, all of which the team defined as important to examine for effectiveness. Throughout the evaluation process, the team took a 'light' approach with limited field data collection and short, focused learning events rather than long feedback workshops, in order to ensure buy-in from relevant staff and the opportunity for UNICEF and stakeholders to provide feedback along the way. This was conducted to assist with a more conflict- and fragility-sensitive CPD for UNICEF.

This evaluation is both summative and formative as it provides both a retrospective review and offers forward-looking learning and adaptation. The retrospective review provides a preliminary assessment of

UNICEF's response to the Cabo Delgado crisis with regard to the aspects detailed in 2.1 (evaluation purpose and objectives. It draws out key lessons and recommendations for adjustments at mid-term and inform the response transition from L2 emergency to long-term strategy.

In accordance with the TOR, the evaluation team adopted the following approaches in designing and implementing the evaluation:

- A utilization-focused approach was adopted with a view to identifying and addressing the information needs of end users.
- An approach based on human rights, gender equality- and equity was followed, as required by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).
- Data collection in Cabo Delgado was specifically designed to be qualitative and based on the three key research questions and the evaluation matrix (discussed below).

2.3 Methodology

This section presents the phases of the evaluation and describes data collection, data analysis, validation and reporting. It also explains quality assurance, relevant ethical considerations and methodological limitations.

The LFE was structured in three phases:

1. The **inception phase**, which included discussions with UNICEF staff and a kick-off meeting to provide input; collecting relevant UNICEF and humanitarian, policy and relevant online documents to inform the inception report and qualitative research tools, with a continued analysis of background documents undertaken throughout fieldwork (iteratively) in order to understand gaps; an expansion of the learning agenda to develop the full evaluation matrix with relevant sub-questions; development of the methodology and work plan for data collection; and tool development for key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs), which was based on the relevant research questions and approved by UNICEF. During this phase, discussions continued between UNICEF and the LFE team and agreement was reached on the key objectives, potential questions for respondents, identification of potential key informants, and agreement on reporting methods. The KII and FGD guides were written with the intention of disaggregating them into eight guides that specifically targeted the relevant respondents.[31] The guides each had a set of questions to serve as a menu, depending on the type of respondent, and not all questions were asked of all respondents.
2. The **data collection phase**, which included a continuation of the aforementioned analysis of background documents, translations of questionnaire guides, fieldwork in Cabo Delgado (three days in Pemba, two in Montepuez and one in Metuge) for KIIs and FGDs, and remote KIIs with key stakeholders that occurred 9 July–9 August 2021.
3. The **analysis, validation and reporting phase**, which included a learning dissemination and feedback session with UNICEF staff to comment on the conclusions based on the findings and two presentations of the draft report.

[31] UNICEF partner staff, UNICEF staff, Government, community leaders, community committees, youth, internally displaced communities and host communities, with additional questions for persons with disabilities and caregivers

2.3.1 Data sources

The LFE drew data from the following sources:

- **Documents**: there was a preliminary document review during the inception phase, and a continued review during the data collection phase in which the contents of documents were analysed against the evaluation matrix of key evaluation questions. Documents were collected in a document repository which was continually updated during the evaluation. Monitoring data produced by UNICEF was used in the Inception Phase to understand what had been collected. Collecting secondary monitoring data from partners, however, was beyond the scope of this evaluation and therefore the team relied on this data from UNICEF.
- **People**: Data collection consisted of 48 KIIs and 15 FGDs (with 4–8 people per group) that were conducted in-person in Cabo Delgado or remotely. Interviews and groups were based on key evaluation questions and sub-questions identified in the evaluation matrix. Annex 3 includes a list of stakeholders consulted and FGDs conducted. These largely fell into the categories of affected communities (host and internally displaced), UNICEF staff, UNICEF partners, and government staff (see Annex 3 for details).
- **Site visits**: Site visits were conducted in Cabo Delgado province by evaluation team members based in Mozambique. These included Paquitequete community and Pemba city in Pemba, Tartara community in Metuge, and Nacaca community in Montepuez.

2.3.2 Sampling

Given the limitations to methodology (see below), the evaluation team relied on a nonprobability sampling strategy using a mix of convenience and purposive sampling. A stakeholder list was developed from consultations with MCO staff, based on relevance to the emergency response and stakeholder availability. Consulted stakeholders included MCO and regional staff, implementing partners, government staff, civil society organizations, host community members, internally displaced persons, persons with disabilities and their caregivers, and youth aged 18–25.

Three sites in Cabo Delgado were selected for site visits as UNICEF had implementing partners in these areas: the research sites were Pemba (Paquitequete community, where displaced people are living with host families, and Pemba City); Metuge (Tartara community) and Montepuez (Nacaca community) where internally displaced persons have been relocated and host communities are either within the same area or close by. The criteria for selection of the three research sites were: timing and accessibility for six days of fieldwork; multiple types of beneficiaries of WASH, education, and protection programming; security (in low-risk areas); and prevalence of host community members and internally displaced persons so as to gather perceptions about the emergency response from both groups.

Figure 2.1: FGD with youth, Cabo Delgado

Remote data collection with additional stakeholders was undertaken to explore lines of inquiry around the emergency response.

The research team originally planned to carry out 5–10 FGDs and 20 KIIs. Ultimately it completed 15 FGDs and 47 KIIs in total, with 21 of these in Cabo Delgado, because of the need for more KIIs with relevant stakeholders (see Annex 3 for the list of

respondents interviewed). A total of 43 women and 74 men were consulted during KIIs and FGDs.

The fieldwork in Cabo Delgado occurred from 23 to 31 July 2021. The fieldwork included FGDs with members of host communities, internally displaced persons, persons with disabilities and their caregivers, WASH committees, and youths 18–25, and KIIs with government authorities, community leaders, staff at schools, UNICEF partners, and government staff *(see Figure 2.1)*. The participants for FGDs were invited to participate by a member of the research team, the relevant UNICEF partner in the area or the local community leader. Most groups had four to six participants and all but the FGDs with persons with disabilities and WASH committees were disaggregated by gender and age (18–25 years old; over 25).

2.3.3 Data collection methods

The evaluation adopted a mixed method design with predominantly qualitative methods. The evaluation matrix identified data collection methods for each evaluation question and the sub-questions. All primary data collection was qualitative, via KIIs and FGDs, with a small component of analysis of quantitative monitoring data from UNICEF reports that include relevant numbers of targeted participants. Data collection in Cabo Delgado was conducted in person, while data collection with the additional stakeholders was conducted remotely by phone or an online platform.

2.3.4 Data analysis, validation and reporting

Data was analysed through descriptive, content, and comparative analysis techniques. As significant patterns emerged during data collection, data collection instruments were revised to assist with analysis. Team debriefs were held regularly, both in person and by phone, to compare data and analyse emerging findings. Data was triangulated across the data sources (documents, site visits, people) to enhance data reliability and validity. The inception phase findings were presented to the ERG in July. An overview of fieldwork and preliminary findings and a workshop to validate preliminary conclusions occurred with an extended ERG in August. Evaluation findings and conclusions were refined based on feedback from the workshop, and a draft evaluation report was submitted on 12 September 2021. A presentation of the inception report was made to the SAG on 23 July 23, with a presentation of the final report to the SAG on 13 October. The final report was revised based on UNICEF and SAG feedback and submitted on 15 October 2021.

2.3.5 Quality assurance

The LFE was subject to internal quality assurance processes for all deliverables. Internally, CHC reviewed all documents to be submitted to UNICEF against Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Global Evaluation Reports Oversight System (GEROS) evaluation criteria, norms, and standards. Externally, LFE deliverables were reviewed by MCO, UNICEF ESARO, and the ERG and the SAG established for this evaluation process. The ERG was established by the ESARO Evaluation Section and included emergency focal points and senior staff from the MCO. The SAG, chaired by the ESARO Evaluation Section, included duty bearers (representatives of the Government of Mozambique) and development partners. Its purpose was to review evaluation milestones and deliverables, and to provide feedback. In addition, CHC facilitated ERG learning events to review findings and provide feedback at every stage of the evaluation. Revisions were then made to subsequent drafts at each round.

For quality assurance during data collection, the two research leads served as the observers and notetakers for all FGDs and KIIs and worked with a team comprised of a facilitator and a translator who

spoke Macua, Mwani, Portuguese and English. The researchers underwent a short training session to understand the FGD and KII tools, and then translated Portuguese versions of the questionnaires verbally into Macua and Mwani. The training covered the following topics: project overview; methodology; a full review of the research instrument; discussions about clarity; the specifics of the project (including logistics and goals); prompts; confidentiality; ensuring the comfort of participants; and the UNEG Ethical Guidelines. Review of the instruments involved a walk-through of the questionnaire guides, question by question, an exploration of meanings, the best ways in which to approach the topics, and the objectives behind the pattern of questioning.

2.3.6 Ethical considerations

The evaluation was guided by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation;[32] UNEG Ethical Guidelines;[33] UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System;[34] the revised UNICEF evaluation policy (2018); GEROS; and OECD DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluations. The inception report was reviewed by UNICEF and suggested revisions were made before the final inception report was approved. No conflict of interest was identified with regard to the evaluation team undertaking this mandate.

The research team adhered to the following with regard to the ethical principles of UNEG Norms and Standards, the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation and the UNICEF Procedure on Ethical Standards in Research, Evaluation, Data Collection and Analysis:

- **Integrity**: Honesty in communications; professionalism and trustworthiness; independence, impartiality and incorruptibility to ensure no conflict of interest or influence over others
- **Accountability**: Transparency in fieldwork; responsiveness if a situation arises; responsibility for exercising due care; and accurate reporting
- **Respect**: Due attention to relevant factors (e.g., sex, gender, language, background, ethnicity); fair treatment of all stakeholders; fair representation of different voices
- **Beneficence**: Consideration of risks; maximizing of benefits; doing no harm; aiming for positive contribution

The principal of do no harm: no stakeholder will be put in danger; all possibilities will be considered and mitigated regarding potential discomfort, embarrassment, unmet expectations, stigmatization, distress, etc.

The evaluators and research team have remained **independent, impartial, credible and accountable** throughout all stages of the project. There were no potential conflicts of interest. Local researchers did not hold any vested interest in acquiring benefits from the programming and did not hold positions of power within the communities. No situations arose regarding ethical principles. Additional measure included:

- Obtaining verbal consent prior to all interviews, assuring respondents of confidentiality and informing respondents that they could withdraw from the interview at any point

[32] United Nations Evaluation Group, 'Norms and Standards for Evaluation (2016)', UNEG Guidance Documents, UNEG, 2016, <www.uneval.org/document/detail/1914>.

[33] United Nations Evaluation Group, 'UNEG Ethical Guidelines', UNEG Guidance Documents, UNEG, 2008, <www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/102>.

[34] United Nations Evaluation Group, 'UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN system', UNEG Guidance Documents, UNEG, 2008, <www.uneval.org/document/detail/100>.

- Obtaining verbal consent to record interviews
- Keeping names of respondents confidential – names were captured but not directly identified in the evaluation report. Names were also kept separate from transcripts of FGDs.
- Taking all necessary measures to ensure the confidentiality of interviews. All data collected was transferred to the evaluation team leader and stored in a secure server.
- Respecting COVID-19 protection measures during in-person data collection and minimizing any risk to participants (physical, psychological, social, etc.). The data collection process incorporated prevention measures against the spread of COVID-19. The researchers gave hand sanitizer (hydroalcoholic gel) before and after FGDs and KIIs, and distributed masks to all community respondents. Social distancing was mandatory in the FGDs.
- Not offering participants any benefit other than a light snack if they agreed to participate in the evaluation.

2.3.7 Gender and human rights

Equity is not mentioned in the 2020 or 2021 HAC but it is included as a specific target in the response plan for UNICEF response in Cabo Delgado through inclusion of gender and disability markers. Although gender equity and human rights were mentioned in the ToR there was no specific learning question on this in the evaluation matrix agreed at Inception Phase so there was limited data collection against these criteria. However, the team reviewed UNEG guidance on integrating human rights and gender equality and the UN System-Wide Action Plan (UN-SWAP) on gender equality and attempted to assess whether the response adequately follows this.[35] The evaluation design has attempted to bring in gender equity indicators where possible and analysis has articulated gender-specific results where they emerged. The absence of gender-disaggregated monitoring data made this analysis difficult for quantitative results (e.g., achievement of results) but the team deliberately separated men and women into separate focus groups for the qualitative data collection. Opinions are highlighted in the findings where there were any significant gender differences.

2.3.8 Limitations

Several limitations exist within this evaluation.

First, the on-site qualitative fieldwork was limited because of timing and budget constraints, so it only took place over six days in Cabo Delgado. Therefore, this evaluation does not cover all of the geographic areas of the UNICEF programming. This limitation was mitigated with additional remote KIIs to cover more geographical areas. Second, the research team contacted the UNICEF partners for assistance with setting up FGDs and KIIs within the communities and used the two partners that responded in a timely manner (AVSI and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency International – ADRA). Due to the difficulties in finding assistance in Montepuez, the team organizer utilized partner contacts that had been gathered to set up the discussions. This means that not all programming was actually witnessed or there could be potential geographic or partner bias, but the team has filled in the gaps with additional KIIs.

Third, KIIs included multiple types of staff members at different position levels within organizations and Government, and their knowledge is largely contingent on their position. This could have created some bias. Where the team felt this was the case, follow-up KIIs were conducted with another staff member to

[35] Humanitarian response follows humanitarian principles and these are inherent in the UNICEF CCCs. The UNEG guidance is therefore more applicable to evaluation of development programmes than emergency response.

ensure relevant knowledge was captured. Fourth, UNICEF requested that the research team interview children, but the request was made too close to the fieldwork deployment deadline and approvals were not feasible. Therefore, the teams targeted youth aged 18–25 for FGDs and youth leaders for KIIs. Fifth, the team needed to work around leave schedules for UNICEF and INGO staff, and therefore, some KIIs occurred later than they would have normally been scheduled. In addition, at least one government official was unavailable because of COVID-19 infection. Fifth, the Team Lead was unable to acquire a visa to serve as lead for one of two research teams. This was mitigated by bringing in a second senior-level researcher to lead the second team.

Finally, COVID-19 restrictions (curfews, closures and limits on numbers in restaurant spaces) meant that the research team needed to finish each day before 4 p.m. and return to base, which slightly decreased the amount of fieldwork that could be conducted every day. COVID-19 restrictions also prevented the learning workshops and feedback sessions from taking place in person. While this allowed wider participation, it limited interaction and engagement with the findings. The team compensated for this by using a variety of interactive facilitation tools during online sessions.

3 EVALUATION FINDINGS

3.1 Performance so far: How well has UNICEF responded to the emergency in Cabo Delgado?

This section examines the criteria pertaining to UNICEF performance: effectiveness, coverage and proportionality; quality and coherence; equity, coordination and partnerships; and connectedness and sustainability. Each of the criteria are discussed in reference to the first key question, with themes as sub-sections to guide each of the subsequent findings. Gender-specific results are articulated where they emerged from the analysis of data collected.

3.1.1 Effectiveness

The degree of effectiveness is guided by whether planned results have been achieved, factors affecting the achievement of targets, timeliness of activities, accountability to affected populations, and targeting as appropriate to needs of both adults and youth. This section examines these indicators to present findings that are both general and sector specific.

Achieved results based on indicators and HAC monitoring

Finding 1: UNICEF's response has been appreciated by beneficiaries, but it is not meeting its 2021 targets thus far.

Respondents generally praised UNICEF for stepping up and responding to the crisis in Cabo Delgado and beneficiaries appreciated receiving assistance for immediate survival, with relief items considered timely and useful. However, UNICEF is not meeting all of its targets for 2021.

The targets for the UNICEF response for both 2020 and 2021 are laid out in the response plans (see Annex 6 and Annex 7) and include action in each of UNICEF's core sectors as well as coordination responsibilities in line with the Core Commitments for Children (CCCs). It is important to note that the response plan and the corresponding HAC for 2021 include targets for all emergency response across the country, combining activities relating to several very different disaster situations. The table below extracts targets and results specific to Cabo Delgado *(see Table 3.1)*. This shows that **UNICEF is on the way to meeting its targets in 2021 in WASH but lagging behind in education and child protection**. The scale of the child protection response is very small relative to the planned targets; this may be due, in part, to overestimating the number of children who would be identified for support.

Table 3.1: Summary results for Cabo Delgado response against planned targets, 2020 and 2021

CCC expected results (*high frequency indicator*)	% Achieved in 2020	Planned, 2021	Achieved up to July 2021
WASH			
Affected populations access sufficient water of appropriate quantity and quality for drinking, cooking and maintaining personal hygiene. (*Number of people with access to sufficient quantity of safe water*)	54%	160,000	147,185
Education			

Children and adolescents have equitable access to inclusive and quality learning opportunities. (N*umber of children accessing formal and non-formal education, including early learning)*	8%	174,083	50,763
Child protection			
Mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) needs of children, adolescents and caregivers are identified and addressed through coordinated, multisectoral and community based MHPSS services. (*Number of children who have access to psychosocial support through child-friendly spaces and schools)*	n/a	157,500	3,610
Child protection systems are functional and strengthened to prevent and respond to all forms of violence, exploitation, abuse, neglect and harmful practices. (*Number of children who receive case management services)*	n/a	30,000	1,368

Source: UNICEF HAC Monitoring, July 2021

While the emergency response plan for 2021 includes gender markers, there are no disaggregated results reported in the monitoring. It is therefore difficult to assess gender equity. The MCO is making progress in improving this through a gender-specific online data platform, as well as in working with local civil society organizations (CSOs) to implement gender-specific programming and monitor results of the interventions for men, women, boys and girls.

In Nampula Province, where internally displaced persons from Cabo Delgado have sought refuge, UNICEF, with internal financing through partnerships with World Vision and INGC, has constructed gender-segregated emergency latrines and bathing units in the Corrane resettlement site, which is anticipated to host up to 1,000 displaced families. Due to the advanced planning by the provincial government for this site, UNICEF was able to dispatch hygiene and dignity kits to be distributed to internally displaced households by INGC upon their arrival to the new site. Resettlement is ongoing at this location now, with hygiene promotion and COVID messaging from activists from World Vision. The WASH Cluster, with the co-leadership of UNICEF, identified a partner to construct a permanent water point in this site prior to settlement of the population so that water was available immediately.

Finding 2: UNICEF's monitoring is improving but there are still gaps in activity mapping and measuring outcomes.

It is challenging to find a list of UNICEF activities in Cabo Delgado, except within the cluster mapping in the stronger Clusters (e.g., WASH and education) and routine monitoring by the Pemba field office is constrained by lack of information, in part because the response has largely been centralized in Maputo regarding funding decisions, planning, management and coordination. At the time of this evaluation, this is only now starting to be addressed with more Pemba-based staff. **UNICEF does not have documents that explicitly offer an overview of specific activities conducted with beneficiaries in districts and communities by UNICEF partner organizations during the timeframe, and the number of beneficiaries reached**. An activity tracker was developed for use in the later stages of the Cyclone Idai response but never fully adopted by all sectors and is not being used in Cabo Delgado. The surge team in place earlier in 2021 developed a graphic showing the coverage of UNICEF programmes, which is useful for reporting and identifying gaps.

Gender disaggregation of results seems to be missing in the HAC monitoring tables and reporting results by gender in the SitReps is variable across the sectors. This is likely to improve in the coming months as the gender online data platform comes into use.

This weak monitoring makes it extremely difficult to measure the effectiveness of the response in a specific area against specific outcome indicators. It also makes it difficult for cross-sectoral coordination as sectors are working in silos without knowing what support other sectors are providing for the same population. In the existing HAC monitoring it is not easy to extract a summary of results across different sectors for a specific province or district.

Finding 3: There are gaps in some sectors between planned service delivery and services that households can actually access

Throughout the sites visited by the LFE team, respondents talked about challenges in accessing education due to lack of learning materials. In Paquitequete, water has also become a challenge, because internally displaced persons live with host families and the subsequent overcrowding has put pressure on water resources. A gallon of water now costs 10 meticais (about 17 US cents). UNICEF partner staff also noted that access to water is a challenge at schools. Internally displaced persons and host communities reported sporadic access to health and nutrition services through the mobile clinics (mobile health brigades). Key informants reported significant gaps in sanitation facilities at transit sites with signs of open defecation and the limited number of toilets too dirty to use. None of the households consulted during the data collection in the research sites had benefited from a cash transfer.[36] Acção Social staff indicated that it gives psychosocial support to some families via the community committees on child protection, but none of the community respondents indicated that their children have access to psychosocial support or child-friendly learning spaces (CFLS).

Factors which have affected achievement of targets

Some respondents reported that **funding limitations were a main constraint in achieving targets**. This argument is supported by the reporting on funding and achievements in the situation reports, which show some sectors (especially education and social protection) were underfunded in 2020. However, as of 30 November 2020, CERF, ECHO, the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and thematic allocation from UNICEF Headquarters had contributed a total of US$6.5 million to the UNICEF Mozambique humanitarian response in Cabo Delgado. UNICEF Headquarters allocated US$2.5 million from its Emergency Programme Fund to support the scale-up of the response, out of which US$500,000 was assigned for PSEA. With this funding increase carried over to 2021, it should have been possible to roll out more HPDs with partners to respond at greater scale. Instead, the scale of response does not seem to have increased rapidly or proportionally in 2021 (*see Table 3.1 above*).

Other challenges to the timely scale up of the response that were identified include the **inconsistency in strategy and planning due to frequent staff turnover, centralization of the response in Maputo (decisions about funding, planning, management and coordination), and short-term inputs from experts (discussed under Question 2)**. Emergency programme documents appear to have covered short periods (a few months only) so partners could only deliver limited services and then needed to wait for the programme to be renewed.

[36] The cash transfer programme was only implemented in Chiure district, which was not one of the research sites.

Timeliness of action relative to events

Finding 4: The activities conducted served the timeframe, given that it was an emergency.

> *"UNICEF has been very slow on the programmatic side: switching from development modalities and trying to find an appropriate emergency response." KI National*

The disbursement of emergency items such as those discussed above meant that beneficiaries could subsist in the short term, and for this UNICEF is to be commended. However, as evidenced throughout this report, there have been missed opportunities regarding timing. Some parts of the response were 'too little too late'. Recognizing that its section had no experience on emergency response, child protection contracted a consultant to do training on CCCs and response tools. This did not occur until March 2021, however, long after the crisis had started and nearly a year after the first HRP.

Several informants commented that UNICEF had taken some time to reach a full-scale response over the last year. Chapter 1 describes the key events that led to displacement and an escalating crisis, alongside the decision points and action taken by the United Nations and UNICEF in particular. Reports and KIIs indicate that UNICEF followed the Government's position on the Cabo Delgado situation and did not initially treat it as a humanitarian emergency. Despite the UN declaration of the L2 emergency in November, UNICEF was seen to be slow to scale up until after the attack on Pemba. The scale of displacement and reports of atrocities during this attack were widely reported internationally, and this triggered more attention from the United Nations as a whole. Due to the slow scale up, UNICEF's monitoring shows that only small numbers of people were with basic services in April and May, immediately after the Pemba attacks, despite more than 100,000 Mozambicans having been displaced.

One of the successes here, however, was **the Nampula UNICEF office. It was fully staffed and could mobilize an effective response to the influx of displaced people because of its ties to stakeholders** and the ability to take the initiative in moving forward (see Finding 35 for more on this).

Attention given to 'accountability to affected populations' during the emergency response

Finding 5: UNICEF partners and the Government indicated that some feedback mechanisms are in place but most internally displaced persons do not feel they have been consulted in the design of the activity or able to provide feedback and UNICEF does not seem to be monitoring this.

Accountability has been relatively low across the entire emergency response, not only in UNICEF's case. In particular, **displaced people indicated they have generally not had any opportunity to participate in decisions about the response or provide feedback**, particularly on migration and relocation in the resettlement programme. Some, such as those in Montepuez, would prefer a different type of rice in the food assistance by JAM. In Montepuez and Paquitequete, internally displaced persons noted the vouchers distributed to purchase foodstuffs attract higher prices than cash in shops accepting vouchers. This has created mistrust of the shop owner and a sentiment that money is being wasted in emergency programming. Donors and partners do not seem to have taken these sentiments into consideration. UNICEF partners and one government ministry, however, indicated they have feedback systems in place but they can be sporadic: one partner requests students to fill out forms about materials they have received in order to determine how they feel about the assistance, while staff from another partner reported spend time talking to community members about needs. It's unclear, however, if UNICEF has monitored any feedback from communities to partners. UNICEF does, however, forward complaints from

the Linha Verde hotline to partners, but there needs to be greater promotion of this hotline to counter negative perceptions (see next Finding).

Some displaced people have also reported that often, although they have been promised a response after requesting assistance from government staff or trying to get on a list for assistance, no response comes. While this is not something UNICEF can control, it does undermine confidence in the feedback mechanism.

Key informants explained that some in displaced families are reluctant to take part in community-driven service delivery because they view their stay in the resettlement areas as temporary. Internally displaced people largely prefer to go back to their original areas once the conflict ends, so residents have not generally been involved in any activities other than WASH committees. The residents' perceptions of how long they will remain in the resettlement areas, and their desire for it to be short-term, affect their potential for participation in such activities, as many are not currently invested in their geographic areas (see Finding 10 below for more on this).

Some partner organizations seem better than others at engaging beneficiaries and allowing for feedback in specific programme areas (e.g., education, WASH, persons with disabilities). WASH committees indicated they could provide feedback if, for example, a pump breaks, but there is currently no plan for the Government to subsidize repairs and it is unclear how the feedback will lead to a solution. Subsequent findings below indicate that partners such as AIFO also have feedback mechanisms in place.

Finding 6: Most internally displaced persons were not aware of Linha Verde and lack of awareness creates confusion and poses confidentiality issues for some.

The Linha Verde tollfree interagency hotline was established in May 2019,[37] after Cyclone Idai, as a channel for accountability to affected populations *(see Figure 3.1)*. Community members can request information or report issues (sexual exploitation, abuse, corruption, political violence) arising from or relating to humanitarian responses. Internally displaced persons were asked if they were aware of the Linha Verde and most were not. UNICEF partner staff members indicated that some residents are confused about its purpose and it is not always as confidential as it should be.

Figure 3.1: Poster for Linha Verde



> *"Even if we train people on Linha Verde, the families don't use it because they don't understand it, because they see soldiers and think they will answer their questions instead, or they can marry their daughters to the military as a solution. So, it solves one problem and creates another. Families ignore the reality of Linha Verde and just go with their own beliefs. And they need supplies and food so they look elsewhere [to those they think can assist them]."*
> *Staff member 2, UNICEF partner*

[37] For more on this, see Resposta ao Ciclone Moçambique: Linha Verde, 'Resposta ao Ciclone Moçambique', 16 Humanitarianresponse.info, February 2020 to 5 March 2020, <www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/linha_verde1458_dashboard_15th_mar_2020_-_portugues.pdf>.

"[Linha Verde] is anonymous, and neighbours, if they see something wrong, human or children's rights being violated, if they report on Linha Verde, the problem is that Linha Verde will tell the family 'we got a call from your neighbor'." Staff member 1, UNICEF partner

Targeting relative to need and planned inclusion and gender balance

Finding 7: The distribution of essential hygiene and nutrition items and provision of health services to people displaced by fighting in mid-2020 and again in March 2021 was appropriate for meeting immediate needs.

When asked if programming has met their immediate needs, all beneficiaries expressed gratitude for receiving whatever they could, as is normal in this type of emergency situation. **The emergency kits distributed upon arrival (which include some supplies for the first few days), hygiene kits, buckets and soap were particularly well received**. Educational games with children (conducted by AVSI in Paquitequete) have also been very popular.

Interviewees reported that UNICEF has faced some challenges in the supply chain for relief items because of delays in importing key items, sometimes caused by government barriers and bureaucracy, and the slowdown in transportation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Government procurement and distribution systems do not appear to have been the most efficient for an emergency response and partners complained of delays in the release of items from government warehouses. Plans to develop supply hubs in other districts (beyond Pemba City) to speed up dispatch of items to sites for displaced people have not been put into action yet, despite the willingness of NGO partners to manage this.

Finding 8: Respondents throughout the research sites indicated that there are gaps in addressing all households in need because the most vulnerable are not always specifically targeted. They also reported how assistance is occurring via food and voucher distribution, and what is still missing (e.g., lack of space to garden, activities to assist with mental health, and challenges with water and access to health care).

Host community members and internally displaced persons reported **gaps in who is receiving assistance**. This is perceived to be because of issues with distribution lists and **a view that those who are most vulnerable (e.g., widows, orphans and persons with disabilities) are not always specifically targeted as beneficiaries** – especially for food assistance – and are rather lumped together with regular displaced people, and the politics of who qualifies to be a beneficiary.

Some documented challenges in what they have or have not received, and the way it has been distributed, are as follows:

- Food was deemed by far the most important form of assistance and the greatest ongoing need, in part because of the large numbers of people living in each household. However, food has not been allocated according to the number of residents per household.
- In Montepuez and Paquitequete, internally displaced persons noted that their vouchers render prices higher than normal, which they view as inefficient.
- In Montepuez and other sites, internally displaced persons do not have any space for *machambas* (small subsistence gardens) in which to grow their own food (not only because of the lack of space but more importantly because the soil is poor). They also do not have access to fishing, which is a livelihood for those from coastal areas. Respondents also indicated that host communities are selling them space to live on.

- Residents need some form of occupational therapy and income generation to relieve their focus on the trauma they have suffered: internally displaced women in Paquitequete suggested they would like to take care of other residents' children so as to heal and create a form of income. Youths would like access to social activities such as sports.
- Overall, it was widely acknowledged that there have not been enough materials for children and adolescents in the way of balls, schoolbags, and books.
- Displaced people in Pemba also noted that cash stipends given by other organizations (not UNICEF) have been extremely useful as they allow access to other types of goods and services, such as starting a small business, buying school supplies and generally creating empowerment for them to access what they determine to be most necessary.

Several respondents spoke about specific sector activities. Regarding WASH, Paquitequete residents said they face water challenges in both communities and schools. COVID-19 presents a further challenge for those who must walk long distances to find water, so some respondents indicated a need for water facilities in both schools and communities to mitigate travel distances and potential infection from outside communities. Figure 3.2 highlights some perceptions and UNICEF activities regarding WASH.

Figure 3.2: Community perceptions, WASH sector

- In Metuge, the WASH committee educates the community about the importance of cleanliness, e.g., washing hands, cleaning latrines and kitchen items. It also cleans the streets on Saturdays and oversees the two water pumps ADRA built.
- In Pemba, AVSI started adolescent groups that clean the streets each week and UNICEF has given schools masks, buckets and soap during COVID-19, yet there is a water shortage owing to overloaded households with far more residents than anticipated *(see Figure 3.3)*.
- Latrines do not take persons with disabilities into account.
- In Montepuez and Pemba, WASH staff indicated that they need baseline studies to highlight community contexts and rationalize project locations. Communities also need more cement slabs to stand on in the latrines *(see Figure 3.4)*.
- More water points are also needed in some communities so that each does not serve hundreds of people, which makes it more likely to break down *(see Figure 3.5)*.

Figure 3.4: UNICEF/AVSI hand-washing station in Escola Primaria (grades 1 and 2), Kuparata, Paquitequete, Pemba

Figure 3.5: Cement slab to stand on in latrine, Metuge

Figure 3.3: Water pump station, Metuge

Health and nutrition responses focused on the need to support existing government health services and expand outreach through Mobile Health Brigades. In principle, this appears to be a good strategy. Yet it does not ensure access for all internally displaced persons as these services have not reached areas with severe conflict, or those who are living in the bush. Additionally, internally displaced persons noted that while they have seen measles vaccination campaigns, they do not have funds for necessary medications for common diseases and, even if there is a clinic nearby, as in Nacaca (Montepuez), it has nurses but no doctor. There also appears to be limited insight and analysis of the demand for health and nutrition services, and a preference for focusing on supply and resources. However, the January 2021 cholera response was effective in containing the outbreak and a good example of an integrated approach (with WASH).

Regarding education, respondents indicated that they have appreciated UNICEF assistance. They also highlighted some of the challenges and what is still necessary, as discussed in Findings 9 and 10 *(also see Figure 3.6)*.

Figure 3.6: Education: community and government perceptions

- UNICEF has been giving out school materials (bags, notebooks, pens), constructing classrooms and working with AVSI in Paquitequete on education programmes in homes.
- MINEDH previously delivered school materials to hotspots via boat but this has stopped.
- MINEDH told schools they were not allowed to charge internally displaced students to study and is working with communities to sensitize families to send children to school.
- The prioritization of persons with disabilities in schools seems to depend in part on personalities: the current Director of MINEDH in Pemba puts a premium on this, whereas in the past it was less a focus.
- Education staff indicated that the education cluster 4Ws is not always updated consistently, making it difficult to determine what is occurring.
- Some displaced people do not send their children to school based on distance, lack of materials, or fear of ridicule for being internally displaced persons.
- Communities need CFLS, training for teachers on working with internally displaced persons, more classrooms and footballs.

Regarding gender, after identifying weaknesses in targeting for gender-specific activities in the Cyclone Idai response, UNICEF has developed tools for disaggregating data by gender to be able to track specific results for women, men, boys and girls. There are also efforts to better analyse the gender dimensions of the conflict in Cabo Delgado in order to better respond to the needs of different groups. Examples of gender-specific needs being met include the dignity kits distributed to internally displaced persons. **The LFE did not find evidence of specific gender gaps from the focus group discussions.**

Finding 9: Despite a UNICEF focus on education, access to it is a major challenge for internally displaced persons

As noted by youth, Ministry of Education and Human Development (MINEDH) staff and a UNICEF partner, not all displaced children have access to a school, either because they do not have materials (including books, pens, uniforms, masks) and there are not enough education kits, because the school is deemed too far away or because it causes tension for internally displaced persons. Regarding the latter, in Metuge, young women indicated that youths are not attending school because they are ridiculed for being internally displaced persons by other children. While members of this displaced community indicated that stigmatization is largely confined to children rather than adults in the host communities, it still poses a disincentive to attend school. Other children simply prefer to stay close to their families, which may be a psychological carryover from having to flee their homes.

Figure 3.7: UNICEF/AVSI poster to encourage children to go to school. It promotes education as a human right that assists people in becoming better citizens.

While COVID-19 restrictions closed schools during certain periods, **CFLS were not operational in the areas with internally displaced persons visited by the evaluation team and it is unclear what the plan is for these**. Internally displaced persons are relying on existing schools for education opportunities and there are problems with integration as discussed above. It is unclear how scaling up teacher training to specifically recognize and address the needs of internally displaced persons is to occur.

Finding 10: Perceptions of relocation as temporary inhibit access to education.

An additional disincentive to accessing education is the perception by some community members of their relocation as temporary. Therefore, they are not entirely invested in sending their children to schools in the relocation areas. COVID-19 restrictions on school operations meant school closings in 2020 and 2021 which, along with perceptions of relocation, likely set a precedent for some who did not register once schools reopened. Youth and educators indicated that some youths desire to attend school while others do not. The latter therefore require incentives, yet not all schools are offering strong incentives (e.g., lunch distribution).

While access to education is almost universal in the first three grades, there is less in the upper primary and secondary years, and some simply do not return even if given a potential opportunity. This indicates the need for other types of engagement outside of secondary school, such as vocational skills building – along with access to employment – for groups of youth who feel aimless. Access to vocational skills, as well as the AVSI adolescent cleaning group (discussed in the next finding), were both deemed particularly useful. UNICEF is addressing this gap through the NFE project for 835 youth (15–18 years) who are engaged in training on the job and professional skills.

Meeting the needs of adolescents/youth

Overall, youths trust their parents and teachers. Some went so far as to say that decision-making processes are democratic and, in community meetings, youth have submitted requests for items (e.g., in Metuge, footballs to fill their time). In Montepuez, however, one youth leader indicated that there is some tension between older and younger generations because of differences in ideologies or goals.

Finding 11: With limited exceptions, adolescent and youth programming lacks activities to help foster psychosocial support and a sense of fulfilment.

Several discussions highlighted the need for activities that allow for fulfilment and hope.

- Adolescents and youth generally need something with which to fill their time: football came up repeatedly amongst youth leaders and young males as a way to help them think about something other than the atrocities they have witnessed.
- At the same time, however, where they live (e.g., a resettlement location in the same town as others) dictates where they can play. These types of geographic boundaries therefore need to be understood in order to develop appropriate activities in which internally displaced persons can engage.

> *"One day I came here from home and I wanted to play football, and because I'm an IDP from another area, I wasn't allowed to play in this area. They said I couldn't play here because they were not my host community. So they ran us away because we don't belong in this community. We have to be very patient and we have to be careful to be controlled so that we don't fight. On Sunday we used to play football on the beach, and other days we just can watch others play here." Male IDP, Paquitequete*

- Young, displaced women in Metuge also indicated there is tension with the host community over their 'refugee status' and the assistance they receive.
- Respondents indicated that girls are marrying young to satisfy their needs (generally involving the potential for material resources) and parents allow this because the family requires additional assistance.

All of these situations indicate **a clear need for activities that is not currently being consistently met. Whether these occur through school, leisure activities or additional types of training, children and youth need to be occupied to help mitigate the trauma of their experiences and avoid looking for means of support outside the family, and in order to feel a sense of hope about the future**.

One example of a successful activity is AVSI's socializing programming and cleaning clubs, in which boys clean up communities, as well as advise other youths.

"We look for PWD who are children, we give advice to sick people, we give them water … UNICEF gives money to AVSI to buy cleaning materials." Staff member of youth group, Pemba

3.1.2 Coverage and proportionality

Coverage and proportionality are measured by geographic area, increased scale of response, reaching the most vulnerable, and access to services and hard-to-reach areas.

Geographic area covered by response

Finding 12. While UNICEF is working in multiple districts in Cabo Delgado, its geographic coverage versus its ability to implement is insufficient and signifies that it is stretching itself too thinly.

The UNICEF response is mostly focused in six districts in Cabo Delgado (see annexes 6 and 7 for coverage by sector). The nutrition sector seems to have reached the most districts (including Nangade and Palma) with nutrition screening, though programming is insufficient. WASH has the biggest programme overall, and the highest number of partners, but the geographic coverage is low *(see Figure 3.8)*. This presents a crucial challenge when placed alongside the minimal coverage of needs in accessible areas. Some **informants suggested that UNICEF is not able to spread out to cover multiple additional districts with its current partner capacities**. Partner staff indicated that the decision to have one partner per district was problematic because of a lack of capacity and that a more holistic, complementary approach should be adopted, especially regarding partners' capacity prior to channel funds.

Figure 3.8: UNICEF WASH response, 2021



Source: UNICEF CD Response coverage, February 2021

Increase in scale of response

Finding 13: The needs of internally displaced persons were generally unmet in 2020.

Situation reports indicate that the 2020 scale-up was very slow: in June of that year, IOM estimated that 250,000 internally displaced people were in need. (This does not include the needs of host households and residents, or those fleeing violence in hard-to-reach areas.) By October 2020, the estimated number of internally displaced persons had increased to 355,000. At this time, UNICEF's sanitation response had reached 130,000 displaced people, which is notable. But the rest of the UNICEF response was only reaching between 10,000 and 50,000 people. The child protection response reached only 8,000 children,

despite reports that over 50 per cent of the displaced were children.[38] This indicates that most needs were vastly unmet in 2020.

According to the 2021 HAC, there was a significant scale-up of 2021 targets between November 2020 and June 2021.[39] The numbers in Figure 3.9 relate to all humanitarian needs, including post-cyclone needs and needs for the COVID-19 response. Staff indicated that the services being delivered are still a very small fraction of the needs indicated by community members and UNICEF staff.

Figure 3.9: Humanitarian Action for Children targets, 2020 and 2021



Source: UNICEF. June 2021. Humanitarian Action for Children

Finding 14: Targets are still based on a percentage of the estimated people in need, rather than a more accurate estimation of needs based on a needs assessment in each sector.

UNICEF targets versus estimated sector needs (people in need - PIN) vary across the sectors with the highest percentage of people targeted by health (90 per cent) and the lowest targeted by SP (three per cent). **In sectors such as education and child protection, where UNICEF has traditionally led and where it holds a unique response capacity, targets are relatively low compared to needs (45 per cent and 55 per cent, respectively).**

By June 2021, UNICEF results were improving: 156,000 people were being provided with safe water, 456,000 had been screened for malnutrition and 307,000 were accessing education. But it is important to note that these are figures for all emergency geographic areas (within and outside of Cabo Delgado), and still only represent a small fraction of the estimated needs, particularly for the displaced population in Cabo Delgado.

[38] UNICEF, 'Mozambique Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2 (Cabo Delgado): November 2020', Situation Report, UNICEF, 21 December 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/unicef-mozambique-humanitarian-situation-report-no-2-cabo-delgado-november-2020>.

[39] See HAC draft, Nov 2020, and HAC revision, June 2021. UNICEF has gradually increased the target numbers for providing services across all the emergencies in Mozambique from 9,000–50,000 people across the sectors in June 2020 to 400,000–500,000 people in June 2021.

Reaching the most vulnerable

As is illustrated in Finding 8, while several partner organizations specifically focus on vulnerable displaced people and should be commended for this, the most vulnerable, including widows, persons with disabilities and orphans, have not been consistently targeted across all geographic areas, sectors and organizations.

Reported and measured access to services

Finding 15: Although the response has increased in 2021, there are gaps in meeting basic needs, and response differs by partner.

Services are sporadic and largely depend on location and partner. WASH seems to be the strongest sector whereas health has been weaker. **While many of the immediate health needs of internally displaced persons seemed to have been addressed at Paquitequete Beach upon their arrival by boat, some respondents perceived it to focus predominantly on pregnant women or perceived that health was no longer a priority once they had moved to host families**. Internally displaced persons in all the areas indicated that they cannot afford medications. In some areas, such as Nacaca (Montepuez), community members noted that there are only nurses staffing the nearby health clinic and no full-time doctor. AIFO staff indicated they focus on persons with disabilities but, as is discussed below, not all other partners do. Access to psychosocial support seems sporadic and although Acção Social and AVSI staff indicated that they work in this area, community members largely reported that they do not have such access. This has been perceived as a key challenge as internally displaced persons, particularly youth, indicated they need assistance and activities to keep their minds off the horrors they have encountered.

Barriers to accessing hard-to-reach areas

Finding 16: The conflict is the most common reason for inability to access difficult areas.

Community members and staff indicated that the greatest barrier in getting to hard-to-reach areas is the conflict. While United Nations agencies and government ministries indicated that there are simply no-go zones (e.g., Macomia, Moçimboa da Praia, Quissanga, Palma, Muidumbe and Nangade), one respondent indicated that organizations such as MSF are entering some of the hotspots.

Additionally, MINEDH staff indicated that, at one point, they took supplies by boat to coastal hotspots but have since ceased. They also cited resource and funding shortages that prevent them from accessing certain areas, such as Ibo Island. **Other United Nations and NGO respondents suggested that UNICEF's approach to the response was very risk-averse compared to other organizations and there may be room for management to re-examine its definition of 'hard to reach' areas**.

3.1.3 Quality and coherence

Evaluation of quality and coherence focuses on compliance with relevant standards and policies (CCCs and Sphere), alignment with perceived comparative advantage, cluster coordination and the promotion of humanitarian principles.

Adherence to relevant standards and policies (CCCs and Sphere)

Finding 17: UNICEF's response plans are closely aligned to CCCs and in sectors with strong, experienced cluster coordination the response activities appear to follow CCCs and Sphere.

However, the general lack of humanitarian experience of UNICEF staff and its partners has meant that many managers responsible for delivering responses have not been familiar with CCCs or Sphere and tend to rely heavily on government standards. For example, one respondent noted that UNICEF was waiting for the Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources (MOPHRH) to approve the latrine design before they could build latrines in resettlement sites.

Alignment with perceived comparative advantage

Finding 18: Alignment with comparative advantage is low, but plans are already underway to address this gap.

Some **key informants felt that the specific needs of children affected by the conflict are not well articulated**. MGCAS staff indicated that they focus on unaccompanied children and screen potential host homes and families for them, but there are few childcare centres or a transit centre dedicated to them.[40] Children are a specific area of competence for UNICEF, but the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) may step up to take the lead in addressing their needs in the current vacuum. SCI has been very vocal on child rights, but it is not a very unified advocacy at the moment. The UNICEF management is taking this gap seriously and the **Representative is leading initiatives to develop a clearer agenda for children and armed conflict (CAAC) with support from UNICEF Headquarters and new partnerships with specialist NGOs**.

Fulfilment of cluster coordination responsibilities

Finding 19: Challenges such as language, centralization, the realities of surge capacity, information management and staff having to fulfil dual roles have hindered the fulfilment of cluster coordination responsibilities.

UNICEF has tried hard to fulfil its cluster coordination responsibilities but, with COVID-19 and the language challenges faced by non-Portuguese speakers, it has been very difficult to get the right people in place. This is compounded by the additional languages spoken in many of the rural regions in Cabo Delgado (e.g., Makua, Makonde, and Mwani). **While experts have come in on surge capacity, they have only remained for a short amount of time. Respondents felt that it has been extremely difficult to build up coordination systems and individual relationships with such poor continuity**. Other challenges reported included the centralization of cluster coordination in Maputo, leaving gaps in coordinating different actors' activities in Cabo Delgado. UNICEF and partner staff noted there is some evidence of information management, in the form of 4Ws, being used in Pemba, but these have been only recently introduced with support from surge staff from global Clusters and partner staff reported challenges in keeping them up to date. Other **standard tools and techniques for cluster coordination, such as standardized needs assessment and results monitoring**, do not seem to be in use.

[40] However, there is a childcare centre called "Lar Esparanza" in Pemba that UNICEF used just after the Palma attacks as a short-term solution. This is privately owned and managed, but UNICEF partnered with it and AVSI to support children there. There was also a CFLS in Centro Desportivo to provide a safe space when IDPs were housed there.

UNICEF has required emergency response managers to also act as cluster coordinators ('double hatting'). The experience of natural disaster coordination seems to have led management to believe that government- and UNICEF-led coordination was appropriate without considering the potential conflict of interest that can arise in a conflict situation. **More experienced humanitarian respondents noted that the lack of independence of the cluster coordinators was a problem and potentially made humanitarian NGOs reluctant to engage with the Clusters**. Double hatting was a necessity given the limited human resources available, but UNICEF have not really recognised the problems associated with this and hasn't prioritised dedicated resources for coordination.

Many national- and regional-level actors noted the relative weakness of OCHA in Mozambique as a constraint to the full functioning of the Clusters, especially regarding inter-cluster coordination and response planning. UNICEF appears to be engaging with OCHA on this issue and supporting calls for OCHA to establish a better resourced office.

Leadership in promoting humanitarian principles in line with CCCs

Finding 20: At a national level, UNICEF has put systems in place to remain independent and monitor violations of children's rights, in line with humanitarian principles.

UNICEF took a principled stand against using assets from the LNG company, Total. In so doing, the agency reinforced the need for the response to remain independent, in line with humanitarian principles. Senior management also acted swiftly to put systems in place for monitoring violations of child rights, which is in line with the CCCs and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). UNICEF has been praised by other United Nations actors and strongly supported by ESARO for these actions.

3.1.4 Equity

Equity is guided by themes that focus on inclusion of persons with disabilities and evidence of strategies to avoid marginalization of specific groups. The UNICEF HAC talks about inclusive action but there is no explicit objective on gender equity. Gender equity (and other components of GEEW) were not included a specific criterion in the evaluation matrix so there was limited data collected on this during the field work. However, the team did analyse the findings against the standard criteria for GEEW and found no evidence of gender inequity but some weakness in promoting gender empowerment.

Inclusion of persons with disabilities in activities and monitoring

Finding 21: Assisting persons with disabilities has been emphasized and mainstreaming of persons with disabilities in sector plans is evident and continuing to scale up, but it has not been fully mainstreamed with all partners.

UNICEF has made inclusion a priority in its programming and employed a dedicated specialist to guide mainstreaming and interventions for people with disabilities. UNICEF has specifically partnered with AIFO, which emphasizes assistance to persons with disabilities by identifying and supporting them in affected populations. UNICEF received disability-specific funding under child protection, which has led to an emphasis on child protection training for partners regarding disability inclusion, and early identification and intervention. Trainings regarding persons with disabilities are ongoing, with more planned for the rest of the year: training within the WASH sector has already occurred; protection training of partners such as NGOs and Government is ongoing with health extension workers, and training for education organizations will occur in September. The clear persons with

disabilities strategy also includes mainstreaming results for persons with disabilities in sector activities and this is reflected in WASH and education plans and PDs.

While persons with disabilities were considered a crucial group on which to focus, **the research team specifically interviewed groups of disabled people and their caregivers, and there was spotty evidence that they were consistently being targeted for assistance via all partners and in all areas, or that they had access to facilities designed for them**. Internally displaced persons indicated that disabled people seemed to be lumped in with other displaced people on a regular basis, and some people with disabilities in the fieldwork locations receive assistance, while others do not.[41] One UNICEF partner indicated that community leaders had difficulties identifying persons with disabilities but the research team found that the leaders largely knew who and where the disabled people in their communities were.[42]

As noted in the site visits and discussed by one of the UNICEF partners, while some latrines have been built for persons with disabilities, specific disabilities have not been considered. Disabled people in Metuge corroborated this, saying they use the same latrines as other community members. One UNICEF partner indicated that persons with disabilities were not taken into consideration in any of their WASH interventions. Although directly responding to the needs of disabled people is part of UNICEF's inclusion strategy, there was no evidence that UNICEF has distributed much-needed items such as wheelchairs, hearing aids, glasses, etc. Persons with disabilities and their caregivers noted the importance of these items.[43]

AIFO has trained AVSI, SCI, and We World-GVC on disability inclusion. AIFO has also trained government authorities at the provincial (Pemba) and district (Montepuez, Pemba, and Balama) levels, IOM and UNHCR staff. They also work with MGCAS to raise awareness to keep children with special needs in school and help them access services and support, but MGCAS staff indicated that it is a challenge to keep persons with disabilities engaged in participation and response. AIFO staff indicated that participants have referred children with disabilities to them. They are planning training for later this year with several other NGOs. AIFO has not yet trained any UNICEF staff and one UNICEF staff member indicated that face-to-face training has been postponed several times in anticipation of new staff coming in and because of COVID-19 travel restrictions.

When asked what they need in order to scale up trainings, AIFO staff indicated they would like to have additional materials to further consolidate training modules and the ability to conduct refresher training and peer-to-peer coaching for technicians so they can also educate others in their workplaces.

Strategies to avoid the marginalization of specific groups

Finding 22: Local contexts and leaders can be more political than desired under an emergency, especially regarding nepotism, favouritism and corruption in the distribution of community assistance.

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[41] Displaced persons with disability in Metuge indicated there had been special lists for them in Metuge town, but not in their current location.

[42] This may simply be a product of timing: when large numbers of displaced people were coming in, it was difficult to ascertain who was who but, given that many are settled into their respective zones, it is likely easier now to determine.

[43] Some partner organizations such as AIFO and AVSI are giving persons with disabilities these types of items, but the evaluation team found no evidence of distribution being supported by UNICEF.

In discussions of relationships between communities and local leaders within areas with displaced people, **there has been some contestation on the transparency and fairness of the local leadership with the different distribution lists, regarding nepotism, favouritism, and corruption**. This can be further exacerbated when an internally displaced community is moved into a host community, as it becomes unclear which local leader has greater clout and leads to contestations over relative or absolute legitimacy. This brings up the question of local political power dynamics that need to be considered when designing interventions, as playing favorites with distribution lists leads to the marginalization of those who may be eligible but have not been considered. Respondents also indicated that widows and the elderly were not being targeted as distinct beneficiary groups that required special assistance.[44]

AVSI is conducting school sessions at homes for children who are not in school; this includes exercise activities, games that assist with reading and counting, or activities connected with the normal daily lives of children. AVSI also identifies difficult cases that may require psychosocial support for follow-up, while AIFO identifies persons with disabilities – these were the only examples given by respondents of such support.

The sector responses do not appear to have strategies to deliberately address gender inequalities and women's empowerment. **Some respondents felt that this weakness meant that women were further disempowered through exclusion from decision making on issues such as distribution of relief kits, location of latrines, etc**. This was also highlighted as a weakness in the Cyclone Idai evaluation. There were plan for targeted activities to identify marginalized women, specifically through engaging local women organizations to support the government, UNICEF and WFP in identifying beneficiaries and include vulnerable women and girl survivors of GBV, including adolescent girls who are mothers.

3.1.5 Coordination and partnerships

Coordination and partnerships are guided by themes that focus on cluster mechanisms, effective local and government partnerships, capacity building of local partnerships, and collaboration with other United Nations agencies.

Performance of UNICEF-led cluster mechanisms compared to IASC standards

Finding 23: Initial gaps and overlaps in response are being overcome by better cluster coordination in Cabo Delgado.

Coordination mechanisms are being established in sectors where UNICEF has responsibilities, but this has been slow and inconsistent, with frequent changes in leadership. WASH and health collaboration and cross-sector coordination have been relatively strong and functioned well during the cholera outbreak. NGO informants indicated that the coordination mechanisms were still relatively weak and gave the example of a WASH cluster coordinator in Pemba who doesn't speak Portuguese. They also mentioned their reluctance to complete the 4Ws, which suggests a failure to get buy-in for the 4Ws as a necessary tool for coordinating action across a particular sector.

Effectiveness of local partnerships

Finding 24: From the perspective of partners, the UNICEF-partner relationships have been largely positive.

[44] In Montepuez, there was a plan to construct latrines for the elderly, but it was not completed.

Partners acknowledge that they would not have been able to implement projects without UNICEF assistance and that UNICEF is proactive in resolving issues within the WASH cluster group, has conducted site visits, and responds to partners. Its speed in responding to critical events and serving as a reliable source of information for community members has also been commended.

However, **partners also noted some inherent challenges for partnerships. These involved duplication of programming, siloed organizations, confusion about rules and a slow disbursement of funds that has caused problems for some smaller NGOs**:

- Initially, there were multiple overlaps and gaps due to too many or too few partners working in each sector, without knowledge of who was doing what, but the cluster groups are beginning to coordinate this more successfully. One solution proposed for improving understanding was for UNICEF to determine who is working where, in which specific programming and with whom, and then strategize from there. During the period of data collection, multiple respondents noted duplication across areas and organizations working in siloes. Duplication occurs because many organizations are working in the same place (because, for example, it is easily accessible) while other areas have gaps. This indicates that certain areas evolve faster than others because they have greater access to assistance from various partners. One partner also specifically mentioned that the lack of coordination in the response creates gaps in follow-up on cases: when the partner has been managing a family case but the family moves before the organization has finished monitoring them or assisting the disabled, and does not know to where they have moved, there is no further follow-up. To a certain extent, however, coordination within certain sectors seems to be improving: one government staff member said that fortnightly meetings have improved knowledge of who is conducting which activities in different geographic areas.
- Local partners and development NGOs do not always know the 'rules of the game' and need training on these to understand how the United Nations and donors work, and the protocol with humanitarian principles.
- There is a lack of clear perception on how UNICEF awards tenders. One partner indicated 'we don't know the model UNICEF uses to decide who gets projects'.
- United Nations bureaucracy is a challenge noted by multiple partners, particularly concerning the timing of financial disbursements and approvals for line-item changes. This is aligned poorly with what needs to occur in emergency situations, where organizations must quickly mobilize but cannot do so without rapid cash flow and flexibility.

Finding 25: The peacebuilding and conflict resolution workshop facilitated by UNICEF Headquarters in September 2020 identified opportunities for new, local partnerships in Cabo Delgado.

UNICEF is expanding its partnerships as more funding comes in and more INGOs come into Mozambique but there is no evidence of reaching out to new, unconventional partners, as recommended in the workshop. Some national and regional respondents also noted that the lessons learned on local partnerships from Cyclone Idai have not really been applied in the Cabo Delgado response. There are obvious challenges with partnership with NGOs and CBOs, including the perceived allegiances of those working in areas controlled by insurgents and the reluctance of the Government to allow access to these areas by INGOs.

Strengths and weaknesses of the government partnership

Finding 26: The partnership with Government is strong, valuable and appreciated, but slows down response because systems are development orientated rather than emergency focused.

Partnership with government in emergency response is a positive step towards sustainability (see Section 3.1.6) and this is demonstrated by the work of the education section with the DPE to develop a new-model temporary learning space (TLS based) on local materials and local community involvement. It took time, but this is now the standard norm for TLS in the province.

However, several other factors are important to note here. First, government staff were particularly appreciative of and positive about the relationship with UNICEF. Second, some stakeholders perceive UNICEF's partnership and implementation through government departments as a close alignment with government policy and feel that this compromises the independence and neutrality of the response in Cabo Delgado.

Third, the delay in mobilizing a humanitarian response in Cabo Delgado appears to be a feature of the United Nations' alignment with the Government as a whole (not only for UNICEF but across the agencies). While the Government largely denied that there was any emergency unfolding in the province, the United Nations felt it could not develop and implement a full, appropriate response. Only after more high-level attacks in late 2020, and with the Palma attack in March 2021, did the Government and the United Nations start to scale up response activities more appropriately.

And finally, another example of constraints inherent in the UNICEF/Government partnership is the reliance on government-controlled supplies. **Procurement and distribution systems through government warehouses were perceived to be too slow for an emergency response**. Additionally, as noted by one WASH staff member, four million meticais (just over US$64,000) was spent trucking water in for 30,000 people for four months because of poor collaboration between UNICEF and the Government. This could have potentially been alleviated with better communication with the Water Supply Investment and Asset-Holding Fund (FIPAG).

Considering the perception of the government response to the insurgency as heavy handed, and rumours of violence against civilians, UNICEF's close alignment with the Government can be a barrier to gaining the trust of displaced populations. In certain areas, relationships between internally displaced persons and security services can be tense. Young, displaced men noted that the military can ask for an identity document (ID), and if it is not produced, one is suspected of being an insurgent. This is particularly notable given that many displaced people lost their IDs when fleeing and youth note that it has led to high levels of anger toward the forces. This was also seen in the views of some women who fear the military forces. These nuances have the potential to have a large impact on how internally displaced persons perceive Government and could affect programming if partners are perceived as being too closely aligned.

> *"Life is good here but a few weeks ago there were rumours that soldiers would be brought here to protect us, and that scared us. We don't want the military here" Woman, Montepuez*

Investment in humanitarian capacity building of partners

Finding 27: Many UNICEF staff and other high-level stakeholders commented on the shortage of experienced humanitarian partners operating in Cabo Delgado and the challenges this posed to the scale up of the response.

UNICEF's established implementing partners are often more familiar with development programme implementation or natural disaster relief and have stated as much in discussions. However, this does not mean that they lack the ability to scale up skills, with the proper resources and training (see next finding).

The stronger INGOs that are usually present in complex emergencies (Oxfam, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Action Contre la Faim, etc.) were operational during the Cyclone Idai response but have no permanent presence in Mozambique. UNICEF has therefore relied on smaller NGOs with limited experience. **The LFE team found a number of partners carrying out complex, multi-sector responses in Cabo Delgado and their local experience and willingness to adapt were impressive**.

Finding 28: Training of government partners (e.g., in child rights monitoring) has been included in the response planning; other than training on inclusion of persons with disabilities and some work in the education sector, the LFE team found no other examples of UNICEF's capacity building of local or international NGO partners.

Implementing partners in all sectors are 'learning by doing' but are eager for more specific training in complex emergency response, including compliance with humanitarian principles. Partners indicated they have humanitarian skills that need to be guided on how to move from emergency to development programming so as to enhance resilience and sustainability. They also require better clarity on how to coordinate integrated programming: A partner staff member said, "Partners have different methodologies and do things in their own way. There are gaps that need to be filled for better harmonization amongst stakeholders in each sector". While one partner staff member saw parallels between natural disaster and conflict responses, "To do the transition process from emergency to development, we haven't started to think about it to make it practical, but we've done this in Beira [where cyclone Idai hit in 2019]. We have ideas, but we have to be able to improve what we're doing, because the actions from 2019 should be different to 2021."

Another partner staff member also advised UNICEF to "respect the little organizations" as they may not have the same types of structures as United Nations agencies, but they are the entities that understand well what is occurring in local communities.

As discussed in Finding 21 above, **one exception here is capacity building for disability inclusion via trainings in health, education, and protection. These have yielded positive results in the way of outreach and referrals.** The education team built capacity on Accelerated School Readiness for two international NGOs, and the education cluster team indicated that it builds capacity for local government and NGO partners in data management and the AAP principle through a child participation test and pilot trainings for teachers and government staff.

But other than these, **the lack of capacity building for local organizations is a missed opportunity, particularly when United Nations agency staff consistently lament the capacity of such organizations**.

Stakeholder perceptions on collaboration with other United Nations agencies

Finding 29: Evidence of collaboration with other United Nations agencies is mixed, with some informants reporting that relations have been difficult, and that UNICEF is sometimes perceived as territorial and uncooperative. At the same time, however, efforts to establish a joint response programme (JRP) with WFP and IOM are moving forward.

There is a perception that UNICEF has not collaborated as well as it could have to deliver a comprehensive response in sectors like education. Several stakeholders both within and outside the United Nations system view UNICEF as territorial as it does not follow what it has agreed to in collaborating on certain types of distribution via the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG). Part of this may be a feature of the limited staff presence in Cabo Delgado and centralized management from Maputo. Both factors make it difficult to cultivate long-lasting relationships and social capital amongst

agencies and organizations. However, UNICEF is actively looking for ways to collaborate with other United Nations agencies, particularly through the JRP initiative (with IOM and WFP) and in nutrition programming (with WFP). Several respondents praised UNICEF for its successful collaboration with WHO on the cholera response earlier in 2021.

3.1.6 Connectedness and sustainability

Connectedness and sustainability are measured by sustainable interventions, synergies with development programming and strategies, and the inclusion of risk-informed strategies in the new UNICEF CPD.

Sustainability of interventions

Finding 30: Establishing sustainable services for internally displaced persons in resettlement sites is challenging when cultivating roots in new areas is both theoretically and literally difficult for displaced people.

While many of **the immediate survival needs of internally displaced people are being covered, the sustainability of interventions is clearly challenging in an emergency response**. Some sectors have deliberately adopted strategies that are likely to deliver more sustainable services (e.g., WASH Community-Led Total Sanitation – CLTS – for latrines, extension of existing water networks). But affected populations view the distribution of food and non-food items as unsustainable and expressed a preference for livelihood opportunities, particularly access to *machambas* so they can feed themselves.

Challenges are compounded by the fact that many displaced people would prefer to go home as soon as the fighting ends because, “We are just here because of the war but our heart is at home.” (internally displaced person with disability, Metuge) or because there are rules (in Metuge) about hunting for bushmeat that require approval, and approval is perceived as being easier for hosts to acquire than for internally displaced persons. In Paquitequete, many displaced people had never been to Pemba prior to migration, potentially indicating that a majority had no intention of leaving their original areas. The exception to this was some of the youths in Paquitequete, who prefer to remain in Pemba because it is theoretically more stimulating than their origin areas. Internally displaced persons feel humiliated by their inability to earn their own income. The fact that many do not have *machambas* to support themselves by growing their own food and potentially selling or trading the surplus, means they have no choice but to purchase food or salt, which is financially impossible for many of them. This is particularly difficult for people displaced from coastal areas, who are accustomed to fishing and no longer have the opportunity to do so in resettlement areas far from water.

The lack of *machambas* as a crucial missed opportunity for sustainability, living in other people’s homes, language differences,[45] and reliance on handouts, have created a sense of impermanence in the migration areas. Some partners have picked up on this and are trying to prioritize and build ownership of facilities and services via the creation of WASH committees, but even this has its limits, as the financial sustainability of water supplies is likely to be an issue in the future.[46] Mobile health brigades have been successful in delivering emergency health services (nutrition screening, vaccination) but

[45] Internally displaced persons often speak Mwani, a dialect of Swahili, while many host community members speak Macua.

stakeholders recognize that this is an expensive intervention and there exists a need for a more sustainable health service approach.

Unless the internally displaced population can move from a reliance on handouts and an immediate survival mindset to feeling a sense of belonging, and an ability to grow their own food or engage in economic activities, sustainability of the resettlement and the social services within the settlements will remain a crucial challenge.

Synergy and complementarity to development programming

Finding 31: UNICEF has strong relations with relevant technical departments in the Government and has leveraged these to deliver services to internally displaced people.

UNICEF's strategy to deliver most emergency services through government partners ensures connectedness with longer-term programming and clearly establishes responsibility for infrastructure and services with the Government. Facilities developed for the use of internally displaced persons (schools, water supplies and latrines) are not seen as belonging to NGO or UN agencies and are clearly an extension of government services. However, stakeholders expressed concern that government departments would not have adequate finances to continue to run services beyond the emergency response period and plans for continuity and covering operational costs need to be developed.

Finding 32: UNICEF's cholera response combined emergency, lifesaving support with action that builds local capacity for better preparedness and effective interpersonal communication for the next outbreak.

The provision of a senior humanitarian WASH specialist to support the cholera response in January to February 2021 resulted in a considerable increase in capacity in Cabo Delgado. The surge support introduced monitoring systems for case management and facilitated workshops to familiarize partners with international standards for interpersonal communication and risk communication and community engagement. It also strengthened inter-cluster coordination and collaboration. This capacity building and system strengthening is a good example of an intervention that connected emergency response with longer term outcomes and preparedness.

Finding 33: Despite the conflict response initially being treated similarly to a short-term emergency natural disaster, in 2021 the MCO has recognized the need for context-specific programming, capacity building and sustainability.

In the early stages of the response, the Cabo Delgado emergency was treated as another short-term emergency, such as the cyclone emergencies, and the response consisted of standalone, short-term relief actions mostly led by surge staff. In mid-2021, the MCO has recognized that the crisis in Cabo Delgado will be protracted and the new CPD needs to incorporate context specific programming for this area. Many UNICEF staff responsible for this programming recognize the need for capacity building across the office and its partners to meet the needs in Cabo Delgado effectively and sustainably.

One sector promoting stronger collaboration among sectors and Clusters to integrate disaster risk and resilience activities in the CPD is education. This is occurring via collaboration with the World Bank by jointly formulating an analysis and strategic response document with a budget on behalf of MINEDH.

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[46] The Government is not planning to subsidize repairs when they break, so one partner is planning to write a small proposal for this to entice a local vendor to keep spare parts on hand to sell to the communities.

> *"The projects must start at the base and go to the top. Cabo Delgado is not Sofala, it's not Quelimane. There are some projects that will function in one place and not another."*
> *UNICEF partner*

Several stakeholders indicated they would like to see more baseline studies and needs assessments so as to fully understand what communities need, and how contexts may dictate ownership and effectiveness. One UNICEF partner indicated there are still major gaps in activities for out-of-school youth, and that a needs assessment would be beneficial to understand what internally displaced people actually want. A second partner agreed and further indicated that there should be more discussions that clarify what the local partners and Government need and better understanding of community nuances.

Other partners indicated that stakeholders, including those in the cluster discussions, are still "90 per cent about emergency" and that "The little aid we give isn't as valuable as letting communities stand together" within community structures – such as a water committee – to make decisions together. Staff training was also noted as necessary to transition from an emergency response to long-term development.

Finding 34: Strategies for long-term services for resettled displaced people are unclear and there is a need for other programming assistance.

The Government prefers to resettle internally displaced persons in designated resettlement areas. The strategy for adequate services, livelihood options and regular activities for youth is not clear and many internally displaced persons expressed a preference to return to their home areas rather than invest in setting up home for the long term in new areas.

There is an opportunity to leverage significant investment from Word Bank programmes toward these settlement areas through the Northern Crisis Recovery Project. This provides multi-year funding, with objectives aligned to the next stage of UNICEF programming.[47]

Finding 35: Preparedness and anticipatory action strengthened the response in Nampula but low capacity limited preparedness in Cabo Delgado.

The Nampula office was able to work with government and NGO partners to pre-position relief items for incoming internally displaced persons. They also constructed facilities at a resettlement camp before moving families onto the site.

In contrast, the Cabo Delgado government seems to have been slow to mobilize resources to respond to the influx of displaced people. UNICEF had no presence in Cabo Delgado prior to 2020 and, despite ongoing activities to respond to Cyclone Kenneth, the capacity to prepare for and respond quickly to the escalating conflict crisis seems to have been limited. Documents and KIIs indicate that there is progress being made on preparedness in Cabo Delgado through the JRP and efforts to establish hubs for outreach and pre-positioning, as well as capacity building for early response to cholera.

3.1.7 Overall strengths and weaknesses of the UNICEF response to the Cabo Delgado emergency

[47] The stated objective of the NCRP is to improve access to basic services and economic opportunities for internally displaced persons and host communities in targeted areas of Northern Mozambique.

As is discussed throughout this report, there are notable strengths and weaknesses of the UNICEF response. These were discussed in key informant interviews and are summarised in the box below.

Strengths

- Beneficiaries received life-saving support, and the emergency kits were effective.
- UNICEF partners noted there is some evidence of feedback mechanisms with certain NGOs and government ministries which could be scaled up.
- Community groups such as WASH committees and adolescent cleaning committees are useful for internally displaced persons.
- The cholera response was effective.
- Response plans are closely aligned with relevant standards and policies, and with humanitarian principles.
- Inclusion of persons with disabilities is a focus and is currently being scaled up.
- Partners and Government are appreciative of their partnerships with UNICEF.
- Plans exist to move forward with joint responses with other United Nations agencies and partners.
- There is a willingness on the part of UNICEF Mozambique staff to learn what works and what does not work.

Weaknesses

- The needs of internally displaced persons were inadequately met in 2020 and UNICEF's response is not meeting its 2021 targets. While monitoring seems to be improving, serious gaps exist in knowing who is doing what.
- Despite good coverage with C4D in some areas, there still seem to be gaps in knowledge, behaviour and access to services in all sectors.
- Challenges include funding limitations; frequent UNICEF staff turnover; centralization of funding, planning, management and coordination in Maputo; short-term inputs; weak information management; perceptions of UNICEF as territorial; and failure to address adequately the needs of the most indigent households.
- UNICEF does not seem to be monitoring feedback or feedback mechanisms with partners.
- Displaced people lack activities to offer a sense of fulfilment, the ability to be self-sustaining and something to do other than think about atrocities.
- UNICEF's desire for greater geographic coverage and the extent of its ability to implement are not aligned.
- There has been no mitigation of local politics at play with the competing interests of community leaders.
- Bureaucratic requirements such as UN rules, templates to be used, mechanisms for funds to be released and the need for proposal submissions to be English overshadow the ability to adapt and creates cash flow issues for local partners.
- Capacity building of local partners is low, with the exception of training on the inclusion of persons with disabilities.
- Response strategies closely aligned with government policy constrain independent humanitarian action.
- Current emergency-focused activities have a low chance of sustainability, particularly without a plan for self-sustainability for internally displaced persons.

3.2 What UNICEF approaches have had the most impact on the needs of affected households and what are the barriers in the response so far?

This section offers an overview of what has worked, what has not, and key challenges and barriers, with five findings that are linked to the findings of the last section, but further highlight some of the nuances of the implementation of the emergency response.

3.2.1 What works? Examples of application or adaptation of new response approaches or tools

Finding 36: There was limited evidence of innovation and adaptive management in the response. However, there are some examples of new approaches being tested and learning from past weaknesses.

UNICEF capacity was overstretched by multiple, concurrent disasters in 2020 and 2021, and staff feel there was little room for innovation and experimentation. The LFE did identify some examples of new or unconventional emergency approaches:

- Community-based approaches such as CLTS, community health worker management of nutrition, and the Paquitequete environment clean-up campaigns, all of which helped community members work as teams. Community members praised their involvement in community work as a good innovation. The youth in Paquitequete highlighted their desire to have an activity that made them feel proud of helping the community, rather than sitting around waiting for assistance.
- The citizen's engagement platform, *U-Report on the move*, is operational in Cabo Delgado but its use is limited by Mozambique's limited mobile network.
- Collaboration between health, C4D and WASH (and between UNICEF and WHO) for the cholera response, COVID-19 and the delivery of essential services (including hygiene messaging) through mobile health brigades has provided space for learning and adaptation.
- Some partner organizations found ways to adapt to larger-scale United Nations bureaucratic challenges. One project partner indicated that his organization has implemented a financial float in order to disburse if or when payments are delayed or receipt of funds becomes an issue, and the project cannot be put on hold.
- The Nampula field office offers a good example of effectiveness because its field staff are onsite, it has strong relationships with stakeholders, and it is able to make timely decisions *(see Figure 3.10)*.

Figure 3.10: Effectiveness of the Nampula field office

The Nampula UNICEF field office mobilized an effective response to an influx of internally displaced persons that made use of its existing resources and partnerships. This was possible because of the following:

- There was a fully staffed field office, including technical staff that had experience in emergency response (from Cyclone Idai).
- The office had well-established relationships with government and NGO partners so was able to coordinate and agree quickly on response planning.
- When decisions on strategy were delayed in Maputo – for example about CFLS- – the field office chief took the initiative to move forward because of immense need and with government support.

However, there were some constraints as the office could not act independently without jeopardizing the relationship with the Government. Therefore, it could only support affected populations in the areas that the Government had designated for resettlement.

Finding 37: There exists strong leadership on PSEA and established multi-agency networks, but adaptation to the frameworks is needed to address the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse by members of local government and community leaders.

The commitment of the MCO to PSEA is demonstrated in the dedicated resources employed to provide leadership in this area. The experience and energy of the PSEA lead has resulted in the establishment of platforms to monitor and respond to incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse at national and provincial levels. **There are challenges in adapting the global PSEA framework, which focuses on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse by UNICEF personnel and related personnel, to prevention of abuses by local government or military personnel**. The vast majority of cases involve government officials and community leaders. Community leaders do not necessarily receive a salary or have a contract but have genuine power within the communities, which often includes the final decision in various situations. A framework that deals with sexual exploitation and abuse as a breach of conduct, with an administrative response based on the contract, is not necessarily fit for purpose in this context.

3.2.2 Less successful approaches: What didn't work so well?

Finding 38: Local and international staff have stepped up to the challenge and managed the Cabo Delgado response to the best of their ability, but this has been hindered by short-term, centralized staffing practices.

UNICEF attempted to manage the response with an existing Maputo-based team, supported by short-term surge deployment of experts in different sectors. **Many stakeholders reported that the shortage of Pemba-based staff dedicated to the response was a major constraint to achieving targets. The Nampula team was able to respond faster and with more agility because of its established presence and its team of sector specialists already familiar with the province**.

Approximately 40–50 per cent of the staff for the Cabo Delgado emergency over the last two years has been deployed to Mozambique for less than six months, with some only involved for a few weeks. Many do not speak Portuguese and therefore have trouble liaising with government and local partners. These issues have resulted in a lack of continuity of strategy and limited capacity to drive the implementation; this is particularly noticeable in the child protection sector where strategies were developed earlier this year but are only just getting off the ground.

The complexity of the crisis, and the challenges of working with a limited number of partners who require improved capacities, requires a permanent team of dedicated, well-trained UNICEF staff based in Pemba. Despite UNICEF efforts to dedicate a team of eight people to the CD crisis in 2020 and to gradually increase the capacity to nearly 30 people in July 2021, it has taken too long to establish the Pemba office and, at the time of this evaluation, the team was still fragmented. UNICEF could have taken action to fast-track approval for a permanent office instead of waiting for the CPD process.

Finding 39: UNICEF is still learning to work differently with the Government, while reaching out to alternative partners and getting the right balance between national and international organizations.

UNICEF has a strong development programme mostly focused on strengthening development systems to deliver better outcomes for children in partnership with the Government. There is evidence that the response strategy tried to deliver CCCs in an emergency through the regular development channels of national and provincial government departments. This seems to have resulted in some delays in scaling up because of the Government's reluctance to treat the situation as an emergency and UNICEF's

relatively limited experience and capacity in Cabo Delgado. A more agile approach, leveraging its influence to enable government coordination and oversight while mobilizing NGO partners to deliver emergency services, could have been more effective and timelier.

Finding 40: Conflict sensitivity and peace-building workshops and training from Headquarters were timely but the MCO did not have the capacity to take it forward so the initiative stalled.

UNICEF initiated two internal capacity-building workshops in late 2020 and early 2021 to address weaknesses identified after Cyclone Idai:

1. A conflict sensitivity and peace-building workshop – highlighting features of the conflict that influence UNICEF programming and opportunities for peace building, including establishing new partnerships with respected organizations in Cabo Delgado
2. Emergency Preparedness and Response Training – to equip UNICEF and partner staff with the tools and skills to provide a more rapid and appropriate response

The office seems to have found it difficult to put the outputs from these workshops into practice. The management is now adapting and conducting a conflict analysis, including an advocacy strategy and a children affected by armed conflict agenda, but this is late in the crisis to be doing this. MCO clearly made good use of opportunities for mobilizing surge support in human resources but it is not clear whether the standard 'fast-track' tools, such as contingency programme cooperation agreements (PCAs) and emergency CRC procedures were utilized. Headquarters and ESARO support for this (and for complex emergency response capacity in general) could have been stronger.

3.2.3 Key challenges and barriers

Insecurity and difficulty in accessing conflict-affected areas are a significant barrier to covering all the affected populations. There is a perception that UNICEF has taken a particularly risk-averse approach and may have missed opportunities to reach more areas.

Almost half of the Cabo Delgado emergency staff have been on deployments of less than six months, which has resulted in a lack of continuity of strategy and limited capacity to drive the implementation.

Monitoring and reporting capacity (for implementing partners and UNICEF), especially at the outcomes level, is extremely low and consequently response managers have only limited information to support coordination and inform programme decisions.

There were difficulties in the alignment of strategy and plans for child protection in Cabo Delgado with the national strategy and plans. This resulted in a gap in resources that were much needed in Pemba to deliver an agile and appropriate response for traumatized children.

Looking at learning from other situations, adaptations and resilience of communities

The LFE team has found it difficult to track outcomes (and in some cases results) from the monitoring systems and reporting available. This reflects some weaknesses in the emergency monitoring, especially at the outcomes level.

Some of these challenges and weaknesses were also reflected in the evaluation of the Cyclone Idai response. The management response to this evaluation provides some insight into the challenges UNICEF faced in implementing some of the recommendations, particularly as the COVID-19 pandemic started as some of the corrective initiatives were starting to be implemented.

3.3 What actions and changes in strategy are required to develop a conflict-sensitive, long-term programme for Cabo Delgado?

As a forward-looking learning question, the findings and conclusions for this part of the evaluation are mostly incorporated in the discussions in the Recommendations section below.

3.3.1 Discussion of the new CPD strategies

The following paragraphs provide some comments on the draft Programme Strategy Notes (PSNs) based on the evaluation team leader's review.

The Chapeau and many of the PSNs discuss the lack of a preparedness and emergency response culture and capacity among authorities, national and international CSOs, the private sector and the population in general. It is noticeable that, in much of the context sections, there is very little analysis of climate data and risks for each sector, which suggests that UNICEF sector teams are not very familiar with early warning and mapping of disaster-prone areas

In the WASH PSN Emergency, WASH is defined as a separate outcome and there is very little sign of integration of risk-informed and shock-responsive approaches in other outcome pillars. System strengthening is emphasized as a core component but not for better risk monitoring, preparedness and response in the sector. There is surprisingly little reference to disease outbreaks and the need for WASH strategies that protect children from cholera, Covid-19, etc. Overall, the WASH PSN demonstrates a rather silo'd approach to development and emergency action rather than a strategy that incorporates 'nexus' thinking and takes a resilience building approach.

The child protection PSN has a more integrated/nexus strategy (see box) but this doesn't full translate into the results framework, which is still very focused on development activities at a national policy level and doesn't reflect the urgent capacity building and scale up of child protection activities needed in the provinces.

Appropriate nexus thinking in the child protection PSN:

Capacity building of the social welfare system, in close collaboration with MGCAS, will include building a professional workforce at national, district and community levels, establishing referral networks for gender-sensitive and disability-responsive service delivery, and bringing to scale a nationally integrated case management system with linkages to civil society organizations, ***operable across humanitarian and development contexts****.*

The education PSN highlights the high levels of sexual abuse and harassment in schools and recognizes the opportunity for more integrated programming (with WASH and child protection). This thinking is extended to emergency areas. Risk-informed programming is mainstreamed across the strategy and capacity building includes strengthening education in emergencies (EiE) response capacity, with preparedness (including pre-positioning of stocks) also included. Unfortunately, these more resilience-orientated outputs are separated into a specific outcome for EiE in the results framework instead of mainstreaming risk-informed and shock-responsive action across all output areas.

The health and nutrition PSN includes a section on challenges to health services but this fails to mention the likely disruption to services because of natural disaster and conflict. Consequently, risk-informed thinking is not well reflected in the rest of the strategy and results framework.

Suggestions on ways to strengthen nexus thinking are discussed in Recommendation 8 and Annex 8.

4 CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions

4.1.1 Effectiveness

- The rapid mobilization of teams, together with the distribution of hygiene kits and medical treatment to meet the immediate needs of newly displaced families, was effective, timely and well appreciated.
- Local politics and power dynamics are influencing the distribution of relief in general. Beneficiaries feel that some specifically vulnerable groups are not targeted with support appropriate to their needs. Clear identification and registration of each vulnerable group is needed and post-distribution monitoring can be increased.
- Cluster- and UNICEF-specific information management systems are improving and cluster 4Ws mapping provides some information on who is doing what and where for each sector. But, across UNICEF, the current monitoring does not provide enough information on activities in each location to be able to ensure an effective 'package' of support to affected households.
- Accountability to affected populations (AAP) mechanisms are either not being used or feedback and response is not being fully documented across all sectors and geographic areas. There is some mistrust of Linha Verde, which weakens its utility for humanitarian accountability, especially when affected households are afraid of lack of confidentiality or do not see any concrete action in response to reports.
- Many displaced children, especially in older age groups, are not accessing education for a variety of reasons, including stigmatization of internally displaced persons. Too few, if any, CFLS and activities for children has left many children without psychosocial support and effective rehabilitation. COVID-19 restrictions have limited access to formal education, but it should have been possible to provide some type of CFLS on a greater scale across the affected population.

4.1.2 Connectedness and sustainability

- UNICEF's mode of delivery through the Government is a good strategy for ensuring connectedness with long-term programming. It helps in building capacity, harmonization and sustainability.
- There are positive attempts to ensure the sustainability of services (e.g., in WASH) but access to nutrition and health services for internally displaced persons is not likely to be sustained without moving away from a sole reliance on mobile health brigades.
- The overall sustainability of the resettlement of internally displaced persons is particularly questionable without significant investment in livelihood opportunities. Some in displaced families are reluctant to participate in collective action around sustainable services (e.g., WASH committees) and behaviour change communication when they feel their settlement is temporary.
- The combined HAC and response plan that aims to address the needs of populations affected by three very different disasters is not fit for purpose for a complex, protracted crisis. The concept of recovery, rebuilding and return is appropriate for households in a post-natural disaster situation but not for households living in the ever-changing dynamics of a conflict. The current HAC outlines what UNICEF plans to do but not what it plans to achieve and why. Strategic outcomes

for children affected by the conflict are not articulated well. A separate response plan for the conflict crisis would be difficult to manage but would allow for adapted benchmarks and indicators which are more appropriate to the context.

- The MCO's willingness to learn from the response to the cyclones and to the conflict in Cabo Delgado and apply the lessons to the new CPD is encouraging. However, the early direction of the new CPD is still in line with a traditional development programme, despite Mozambique being a highly disaster-prone country. The strategy needs considerable adaptation to integrate disaster risk and resilience activities across the programme areas instead of leaving emergency projects in a silo.
- Collaboration and partnerships will be required to connect the emergency response to more sustainable service provision. There seems to be an opportunity to collaborate with the World Bank and its partners on the new Northern Crisis Recovery Project. The objectives align with a logical UNICEF strategy in Cabo Delgado.

4.1.3 Equity

- The MCO commitment to inclusion, especially of persons with disabilities, is impressive and there is strong leadership and strategy in this area. However, evidence suggests that this may not be trickling down to all partner activity on the ground as well as intended.
- Direct programming for persons with disabilities through specialist NGOs is working well but coverage is limited. More attention to inclusion across all partner programmes is needed but partners need additional capacity building to strengthen monitoring of disability markers.
- Gender equity was not mentioned in the HAC documents. The response included some gender-specific activities, such as distribution of dignity kits and identifying girls at risk of sexual exploitation and abuse, but respondents felt that many of the sector activities did not actively promote gender equity and women's empowerment.

4.1.4 Coverage and proportionality

- Security constraints prevent UNICEF reaching several of the districts in the province and partnership with Government also limits the areas and partners that UNICEF can work with. Some respondents felt that UNICEF had taken a very risk-averse approach compared to other humanitarian organizations and could have taken a more 'no-regrets' approach to reaching displaced populations in highly conflict-affected areas. Similarly, urgently needed services (e.g., latrines) could have been provided without waiting for government approval.
- Despite considerable scale-up in 2021, UNICEF is targeting a relatively small proportion of the population in need in Cabo Delgado, focusing on the areas with high numbers of internally displaced persons, and is providing services to an even smaller proportion of those in need. Discussions with stakeholders suggest that UNICEF may not have the capacity to cover more districts, especially hard-to-reach areas, and could therefore be more effective if it focuses on successfully supporting affected populations in a limited number of districts

4.1.5 Quality and coherence

- While there are gaps in meeting the needs in some areas, the response activities have followed Sphere standards and the CCCs closely. Both UNICEF and the Clusters may need to do more capacity building to make sure all actors are familiar with Sphere standards and accountability

frameworks and are following humanitarian principles. This requires additional resources to monitor and coach partners to reach appropriate standards.

- The MCO fully recognized its humanitarian responsibility for responding to the Cabo Delgado crisis and led the UNCT in taking action. However, the inexperience of the MCO in programming for a conflict crisis resulted in planning and leadership which was not always coherent. UNICEF could have been more strategic and clearer in its aims for the response and mobilized appropriate resources accordingly.

4.1.6 Coordination and partnerships

- Partnership with the Government is strong, valuable and appreciated, but slows down response because systems are development orientated rather than emergency focused. This is particularly apparent in supply chains and in the attempts to adapt social protection systems to provide quick cash disbursement. Other sectors (such as WASH, health and C4D) demonstrated that they have mechanisms in place to quickly respond to emergencies.
- UNICEF has gradually increased its capacity to meet its responsibilities for cluster coordination. However, the continued practice of UNICEF emergency managers also acting as cluster coordinators constrains the independence and neutrality of the Clusters and may discourage some actors from participating. This conflict of interest is not well understood by UNICEF staff.
- There is evidence of weaknesses in internal (UNICEF) coordination both vertically (between Maputo and Pemba) and laterally (across sectors) despite considerable efforts to maintain good communication during COVID-19 restrictions. Establishing a strong team in Pemba to manage and coordinate the response is a positive step but more attention to coordination mechanisms and tools is needed.
- The relative shortage of major international NGOs has resulted in a perception that the humanitarian capacity of partners is a constraint to the response but there appear to be unexplored opportunities to build local partnerships and enhance the capacity of more development-orientated partners. Establishing common funding mechanisms to channel funds to small, local NGOs is a positive step but organizations need significant capacity to apply and manage these funds.

4.1.7 Successful approaches for replication

- Cross-sector coordination and collaboration – building on experience from WASH and health in the cholera response and expanding options for multi-sector activities delivered by one partner. There are some bottlenecks to developing integrated packages, such as sector-specific management of PDs, as well as a focus on achieving sector-specific targets rather than comprehensive outcomes for affected households and children.
- Community-based implementation approaches, including strengthening networks of community health workers and working with CBOs (including women's organizations) for labour-intensive activities. There are opportunities to explore alternative engagement processes beyond PD contracting and more consistently involve community workers (*activistas*) in programme design and delivery.
- Rapid mobilization of teams to provide immediate support to the newly displaced through an establishment of temporary spaces – for screening and referral of malnutrition cases and promotion of IYCF and improving health-seeking behaviours and appropriate WASH practices – at the camps and transit sites for internally displaced persons. Stronger coordination from OCHA

is required to replicate this at scale as a standby capacity. The proposed JRP seems to be more focused on assessment than providing relief and addressing immediate needs.

- Adaptation and use of digital platforms for monitoring (e.g., gender, nutrition). These have the potential to improve the efficiency of response, especially if used by the Clusters in Pemba. They require simple indicators and options to enter information offline because of network constraints. The increasing capacity in information management in Pemba provides an opportunity to advance this.

4.1.8 Approaches that need adaptation or should be discontinued

- Monitoring systems that rely only on HAC indicators are not a useful tool for the response managers. Examples of area-specific monitoring are available in the Clusters and an activity tracker was introduced for Cyclone Idai and could be adapted for use by the UNICEF Pemba team (Chief of Field Office) to identify gaps and opportunities for integrated service delivery. This should be a light tool and designed to aid decision making in the field.
- Local and international staff have stepped up to the challenge and managed the Cabo Delgado response to the best of their ability. However, the complexity of the crisis and need for humanitarian action that can be seen to be independent of all parties to the conflict, together with the challenges of working with limited numbers of partners with narrow expertise, requires a permanent team of dedicated, well-trained staff based in Pemba who have emergency experience for dealing with a politically and operationally complex conflict environment. Despite learning from Cyclone Idai and Cyclone Kenneth, and a commitment to building more institutional humanitarian capacity, the office relied too heavily on short-term surge inputs and it took too long to establish the Pemba office, which is still not at full capacity.
- The child protection response for displaced children is not at the right scale and the evaluation found outstanding protection needs in all sites visited. Up to 50 per cent of internally displaced persons are children (there are approximately 200,000 children in accessible districts), but reports indicate that only a few thousand have received case management and families report major gaps in tracing, psychosocial support and PSEA. UNICEF has been criticized by other humanitarian actors for not stepping up to this key responsibility area.

4.2 Lessons learned

Some of the barriers and challenges have been highlighted in previous responses (such as the response to Idai and Kenneth) but recommended solutions have not been put in place in time to be applied in Cabo Delgado (improved information management systems, EPR training for key staff, strategic use of surge deployments, reinforced AAP SOPs, etc).

There has been rapid staff turnover and new staff did not review or learn from cyclones Idai or Kenneth, so the Cabo Delgado response is starting over. The MCO has tried to respond to some of the lessons learned, including providing EPR training, but it hasn't been considered very effective in building capacity.

The MCO has accepted the opportunity to learn from the last 18 months of response through this LFE and staff have generously committed time to contributing lessons learned and ideas for developing a more agile preparedness and response strategy. Common learning points emerging from the consultations have been:

- The need for more consistent capacity to focus on the Cabo Delgado response from the start of the crisis instead of relying on overstretched and inexperienced staff who were already managing COVID-19 and the recovery and development programmes for the cyclones.
- It is difficult to identify the unique needs of specifically vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities, adolescents and traumatized children, without effective registration and mapping of internally displaced persons. Better collaboration with IOM and WFP from the early stages would have helped with this.
- A well-established field office with sufficient autonomy to rapidly adapt and respond to identified needs delivers a more effective response for children.
- Funding shortfalls can be addressed by repurposing funds from other projects. The education sector demonstrated this with its use of Cyclone Kenneth funds and donors are usually willing to agree to this temporary or permanent type of budget shift.
- Integrated or cross-sectoral programming is challenging in UNICEF but more efficient for delivering a comprehensive response for children in the areas with internally displaced persons. Implementing partners are already delivering a package of services in a more area-based approach and UNICEF can better support this by removing some of the siloed programme management procedures.

Learning from outside of Mozambique on approaches for programming in protracted crises would be valuable. It seems the earlier held perception that Mozambique was not in a complex emergency has hindered this learning. Exchanging ideas and lessons with other UNICEF country offices with experience in this type of programming would be a good way to strengthen the Cabo Delgado response.

4.3 Recommendations

The recommendations have been developed to address the conclusions of the evaluation process explained above. In addition, the evaluation matrix included questions on barriers to the response and solutions to overcoming these as well as suggestions on actions required to improve the response. The key informants' responses to these questions informed the analysis, and hence the opinions of both duty bearers and rights holders were combined with the opinions of the evaluators to identify the most relevant and actionable recommendations for MCO.

4.3.1 Immediate adaptations to improve the emergency response

Recommendation 1: UNICEF needs to focus the programme in Cabo Delgado to fill gaps in unmet needs, especially in child protection. Considering the funding constraints, this could be achieved through prioritization of critical needs in areas where UNICEF and its partners have capacity and access, without expanding the geographic coverage.

Linked to findings: 1, 3, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21	**Priority:** High
Responsibility: Country Representative, Deputy Representative, chiefs of sections, Chief of Field Operations	

There is a need to cover more people in all sectors, preferably by focusing on a few key interventions, not spreading its staff and funding resources too thinly and not necessarily expanding its geographic area of operations. The comparative advantage of UNICEF's close partnership with the Government is an ability to focus on provincial and district centres where internally displaced persons have concentrated and to ensure adequate services in temporary and permanent settlement sites (conforming to Sphere

standards). This strategic focus was missing in the response plans over the last two years but is starting to emerge in the new CPD, particularly in the sector strategies for education and WASH.

UNICEF continues to have a responsibility as a provider of last resort in WASH, education, nutrition and child protection for all populations in need. It is recommended that this is met through standby arrangements for remote support through key humanitarian actors with more flexibility to operate in insecure areas, e.g., through providing supply hubs and building the capacity of local NGOs.

Recommendation 2: UNICEF should commit to dedicated resources for coordination in all Clusters where UNICEF leads or has an area of responsibility. There should be a Pemba-based coordinator and an information management specialist in each cluster who is not also acting as a UNICEF emergency programme manager.

Linked to findings: 11, 14–16, 19, 23, 27, 31, 38, 39	**Priority:** High
Responsibility: Representative, Deputy Representative, chiefs of sections, Chief of Field Operations, Chief of CD field office	

Despite good use of surge mechanisms such as the Global WASH Cluster Field Support Team, there are gaps in coordination at the field level and more could be done to strengthen the response if coordination was up to international standards[48]. After nearly two years of ad-hoc coordination, UNICEF needs to build up dedicated sub-national coordination capacity. This does not necessarily mean committing to placing international staff in Pemba for each sector but recruiting good national staff or partnering with NGOs with local experience to lead this. Both South Sudan and Somalia have moved to this model of collaboration and capacity building and it generally works well with strong, experienced leadership at the national level. In the absence of such leadership in OCHA, UNICEF may need to commit to providing the right staff in Maputo to lead national cluster coordination and link into relevant government agencies.

Recommendation 3: UNICEF should continue to collaborate with IOM and WFP to activate the JRP and jointly strengthen targeting and accountability mechanisms across the response. This requires dedicated staffing for the JRP.

Linked to findings: 1–5, 7, 13, 23, 29, 32, 35	**Priority:** Medium
Responsibility: Representative, Deputy Representative, Chief of Field Operations, Chief of CD field office	

There is potential to combine the comparative advantages of the three United Nations agencies and build on their experience in other countries. Specifically, this would involve adapting WFP registration and targeting tools, influencing and utilizing IOM's monitoring capacity and using this collaboration to deliver a more comprehensive package of support to the households in need. Ideally this should follow an area-based coordination model centred around the main displaced and host communities.[49] Capacity to

[48] Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at Country Level, IASC, 2015. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/cluster_coordination_reference_module_2015_final.pdf

[49] See the latest paper from the Center for Global Development: Jeremy Konyndyk, Patrick Saez and Rose Worden, 'Inclusive Coordination: Building an area-based humanitarian coordination model', CGB Policy Paper 184, Center

provide a rapid response and assessment capacity to reach out to newly displaced populations or recent conflict affected areas should be built into the JRP.

Recommendation 4: There is an urgent need to encourage more displaced children to go back to school, either through access to formal education or by providing safe learning spaces closer to their settlements. The education programme should build capacity in government on how to monitor the integration of internally displaced persons into existing schools and TLS.

Linked to findings: 8, 9, 11, 21, 22	**Priority:** High
Responsibility: Representative, Deputy Representative, chiefs of education section, Chief of Field Operations	

There is an urgent need to encourage displaced children to go back to school, either through access to formal education or by providing safe learning spaces closer to their settlements. The option to provide incentives should be explored[50] and barriers to education investigated jointly with families and local CBOs. In addition to this, the education cluster needs to understand how many internally displaced persons are or are not integrated and to improve the data base management on this issue. This requires building capacity for the DPE and jointly developing a tailor-made response (to deliver formal, non-formal or secondary chance education) for the different locations and districts. Some of this focus is already promoted in the new CPD for education and the collaboration with the World Bank, including the initiative on jointly formulating an analysis and strategic response document, with a budget on behalf of MINEDH. However more immediate action is required to secure access to education for displaced adolescents.

The education team should also look for examples from other countries on initiatives to encourage adolescents, particularly girls, back to school after COVID-19 closures. These can include incentives such as waiving school fees for girls, cash support to poor families and access to technology for distance learning.

Recommendation 5: The capacity of staff and the internal processes of the MCO and its key partners should be reviewed and strengthened to better manage emergency and nexus programmes. This should build on the earlier ERP training but be specifically adapted to filling known capacity gaps for effective programming in Cabo Delgado.

Linked to findings: 4, 8, 11, 16, 28, 32, 35, 38, 40	**Priority:** High
Responsibility: Representative, Deputy Representative, chiefs of sections, Chief of Field Operations	

Capacity development includes both skills enhancement and provision of tools and resources. The MCO could make better use of the flexible tools and fast track processes designed for preparedness and emergency operations. For example:

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for Global Development, 13 October 2020, <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/inclusive-coordination-building-area-based-humanitarian-coordination-model>.

[50] See also "5 actions to bring the most marginalized girls back to school after covid 19" https://www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/2020/05/15/5-actions-to-help-bring-the-most-marginalized-girls-back-to-school-after-covid-19/. Accessed on 12/10/21

- Standby PDs with established NGOs in each area to provide rapid response capacity
- Short service agreements (SSAs) for collaborating with small organizations

At the same time the conflict sensitivity and peace-building training should be scaled up by including resilience-focused indicators in programme plans and training partners on nexus approaches.

A secondary aim of this capacity building across UNICEF and its partners would be to reduce reliance on external, short term emergency staff for operational and coordination roles and use these surge facilities more strategically to develop tools and design response approaches.

Recommendation 6: Review the planning and monitoring system for the current emergencies and consider adopting a more flexible plan specific to Cabo Delgado, with clear strategic objectives and activity and outcome monitoring appropriate for a protracted crisis.

Linked to findings: 2–6, 8, 14, 26, 37	**Priority:** Medium
Responsibility: Resident Representative, Deputy Representative, chiefs of sections, Chief of Field Operations	

Develop the activity tracker to support area-based coordination and revisit outcome monitoring based on appropriate benchmarks, specifically focusing on children in armed conflict and measuring whether service provision is adequate to achieve essential public health and protection outcomes. For example, instead of measuring the number of people with access to appropriate sanitation the monitoring should measure what proportion of the population are using improved sanitation in a particular affected population or internally displaced persons camp. This will highlight gaps in services and potential public health risks.

4.3.2 Changes in strategy for conflict-sensitive programming in Cabo Delgado

Recommendation 7: In support of the recommendations from the Country Programme Evaluation, the LFE team recommends that UNICEF be more focused on doing a few things well instead of too many things poorly.

Linked to findings: 1, 4, 7–9, 12, 18, 36,37,40	**Priority**: High
Responsibility: Resident Representative, Deputy Representative, chiefs of sections, ESARO	

A more focused programme strategy for Cabo Delgado and other conflict-affected provinces in the north would focus on UNICEF's strengths while expanding the capacity to deliver on its core responsibilities. This would involve critically examining the spread of sector activities it is currently trying to support and making tough decisions to focus on fewer projects but addressing more of the critical humanitarian needs and with better quality activities. Specific examples might include:

- Dropping social protection activities and leaving cash safety nets to WFP and the Government of Mozambique
- Using adolescents as an entry point for integrated child protection, C4D, education programming
- Identifying high-impact child protection activities where UNICEF can make a difference and leaving other types of activities to expert organizations (e.g., track and trace is an ICRC strength)
- Focusing on bringing sanitation coverage up to standards in host communities, transit camps and resettlement areas to prevent disease outbreaks

Recommendation 8: Develop a comprehensive strategy for the northern Mozambique programme with a focus on resilience and preparedness. Use experience and resilience models from other protracted crises to develop this strategy.

Linked to findings: 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 22, 26, 34, 35, 36	**Priority**: High
Responsibility: Resident Representative, Deputy Representative, chiefs of sections, ESARO	

An appropriate programme approach for UNICEF Mozambique in these northern provinces would therefore focus more on building resilience capacity to deal with risk at both household and community level, and strengthening service provision systems to be more shock responsive, able to flexibly expand and contract based on need. This is in contrast to a conventional approach, which has parallel and separate basic services and emergency response projects.

See examples and the expanded strategy outline in Annex 8.

Recommendation 9: Explore options for new, strategic partnerships, including partnerships with local NGOs and CBOs with a focus on building capacity for humanitarian action.

Linked to findings: 10, 11, 15, 21, 23–26, 28, 32, 33, 35, 38, 40	**Priority**: High
Responsibility: Deputy Representative, Chief of Field Operations, Chief of field office, chiefs of sections	

Building on small initiatives started by C4D and other sections to engage existing CBOs on community engagement and social mobilization, UNICEF can expand its capacity and reach through a more diverse partnership base. One option would be to focus on engaging youth in social welfare activities in resettlement areas and peri-urban settlements.

Partnership with local NGOs with capacity to mobilise well trained teams to support government in emergency response will also be important. The specific focus of partnerships with local and international NGOs should be on developing a rapid response capacity for new influxes of internally displaced persons as well as expanding the scale of child protection activities.

Recommendation 10: Adopt a programme approach for provincial and district towns that is more focused on expanded service delivery for periphery settlements and less on targeting camps for internally displaced persons.

Linked to findings: 10, 11, 21, 22, 30, 34, 36, 39	**Priority**: Medium
Responsibility: Resident Representative, Deputy Representative, chiefs of sections, ESARO	

Recognize that internally displaced families settled around towns are likely to become long-term residents. Treat displaced families as residents and improve services for all residents, including host families and institutions, instead of providing relief items only to displaced families and using emergency relief approaches. This requires combined efforts in health, nutrition, education and WASH in a more integrated service delivery approach.

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